The Price of Prestige

80 chapter three

indicated an inevitable decline in the strategic viability of Western car-

rier fleets (Cigar 1992 ). The debate surrounding carrier procurement was

indicative of the general ambivalence of the Soviet Union toward naval

power. Aircraft carriers, and naval power more generally, were at the

same time a hated mark of imperialism and a coveted symbol of power

and prestige. Debates within the Soviet leadership, especially during the

Khrushchev years, highlight the tension between the status- enhancing

quality of a large navy, its high price tag, and its questionable strategic

value (especially for a land power such as the Soviet Union). Khrushchev

explicitly viewed most naval force as a prestige symbol with very little

direct military utility. He conducted a long debate with his naval officers

throughout his tenure regarding the advisability of investing in Russian

naval force. His memoirs include many references to such debates.

As another concession, I suggested that perhaps we should have a few high

class modern cruisers for purposes of calling on foreign ports. The ships were

good solely as showpieces, and very expensive showpieces at that.... Our naval

commanders thought they looked beautiful and liked to show them around to

foreigners. (Talbott 1974 , quoted in Booth 1977 , 62 )

As for carriers, in his memoirs Khrushchev acknowledged that those

were simply out of the Soviet Union’s reach.

I’ll admit I felt a nagging desire to have some in our own navy, but we could

not afford to build them. They were simply beyond our means. Besides, with a

strong submarine force, we felt able to sink the American carriers if it came to

war. (Quoted in Horowitz 2010 , 90 )

While the Soviet Union, especially under Khrushchev, was able to

maintain a superpower status without much of a navy, it was not immune

to the symbolic value of naval forces. Even Khrushchev, the main objec-

tor to Soviet naval buildup, chose a large cruiser as his vessel of choice

for his visit to Britain in 1956 (Booth 1977 ). Subsequent Soviet leaders

were no longer able to resist the pressure to compete with Western naval

capabilities. The Soviet Union embarked on a massive naval buildup that

absorbed significant resources and contributed to its economic decline.

Some of this grand fleet can still be found rusting along the piers of sev-

eral Russian ports (Whitten 1998 ).

The first significant Soviet experimentation with naval aviation came

at the end of the sixties. However, while the Soviet navy was becoming