The Price of Prestige

82 chapter three

point of a Thai naval buildup, the most dramatic naval expansion within

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Traditionally, the Thai mili-

tary has primarily been a land force. It is only in the last few decades that

Thai procurement has taken a “heavy maritime bias” (Mak and Hamzah

1994 , 30 ). As Mak and Hamzah note, this shift is hard to explain since de-

spite Thailand’s extensive coastline, the probability of a naval attack that

would threaten Thai interests is vanishingly small. A major naval buildup

in an environment lacking any identifiable threats requires an explanation:

“in the absence of any discernible threat in the region it is hard to see the

reasoning behind a navy’s build- up except for reasons purely of national

prestige” (Wettern 1982 , 1104 ).^25 In a study of costly military acquisitions

in South Asia, Bitzinger ( 2010 ) does not find evidence for a classic arms

race. Regional procurement does not follow a tit- for- tat model in which

two or more adversaries try to match each other’s escalating spending. In-

stead, Bitzinger finds selective and stochastic purchases of sophisticated

modern weaponry. Bitzinger ( 2010 , 63 ) concludes that much of this pattern

is motivated by nonmilitary influences such as prestige and cites the Thai

carrier as the most obvious example.^26 A closer look at the Chakri Narue-

bet seems to support Bitzinger’s assertion.

The Chakri Naruebet is a light carrier, a lighter version of the Spanish

model, capable of carrying a small number of Harriers or a few helicop-

ters. It has almost no defensive systems onboard and is therefore com-

pletely dependent on escorts for its defense. The limited capabilities of the

Chakri Naruebet are further compromised by the budgetary limitations of

the Thai navy. Out of the nine Harriers purchased with the carrier, only

two are operable because of an acute shortage of spare parts. Moreover,

a third of the carrier’s helicopters have been cannibalized for spare parts

as well. Proper maintenance of the fighters would require an estimated

200 million baht, an astronomical sum for the Thai navy (Nanuam 2001 ).

The Chakri Naruebet has been spending most of its time docked at Sat-

tahip naval base ever since its arrival in Thailand as a result of its high

operation costs. Training exercises, which are estimated to cost close to a

million baht a day, have been cut back to only one training exercise every

two months. Even in port, the carrier consumes about 50 , 000 baht a day

(Nanuam 2001 ). In 2000 , after being more or less inactive for three years,

the Chakri Naruebet required an urgent repair, costing the navy close to

five million baht and forcing a delay in urgent repairs of other vessels. In

fact, the main use of the Thai carrier is as a local tourist attraction (Na-

nuam 2000 ). A Thai critic suggested considering the carrier a Thai record:

“world’s biggest toy” (Crutchley 2001 ).