the aircraft carrier club 83
The official justification for the purchase of the Chakri Naruebet was
the need to combat pirates, protect fishing rights, stop illegal refugee flows,
and improve search-and-rescue capabilities (NAVINT 2001 ).^27 Yet no other
Southeast Asian country, all of which face similar pirate and refugee prob-
lems, adopted an aircraft carrier for these purposes. To the casual ob-
server, employing an aircraft carrier as a weapon of choice in the struggle
against pirates or the policing of refugees does not appear to be the most
cost effective of approaches. The fact that not a single other navy in the
world uses carriers for such purposes seems to support an apprehensive
assessment of official Thai accounts for the rationale behind the purchase
of the Chakri Naruebet.
Thai officials often draw attention to the dispute over the Spratly Is-
lands as a potential trigger for naval hostilities that may directly affect
Southeast Asia (Kasitipradit 1997 ). Yet in the case of a full- fledged naval
conflict over the Spratly Islands, which is likely to involve at least five
regional navies (including the Chinese navy) and might well lead to an
American and /or Japanese intervention, the largely defenseless Chakri
Naruebet cannot be of much assistance. Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam,
other actors likely to be affected by a regional flare- up, chose to invest
their limited resources in the procurement of submarines, a weapons sys-
tem that even according to the commander of the Thai Institute of Ad-
vanced Naval Studies, Vice Admiral Nitz Srisomwong, is “the most suit-
able weapon in safeguarding the country’s vital interests” in case of a na val
clash over the Spratlys (Kasitipradit 1997 ).
The Thai navy has been trying, unsuccessfully, to pressure a series of
successive Thai governments into purchasing at least two diesel- powered
submarines. However, the purchase of the Chakri Naruebet reduced the
available budgets for naval procurement and maintenance, thus reducing
the likelihood of a submarine deal. The navy tried to use the Chakri Na-
ruebet as further justification for an urgent need for submarines: “The
scheduled arrival of Thailand’s first aircraft carrier, HMTS Chakri Narue-
bet, from Spain next month makes it even more vital that the navy has
submarines — to escort the carrier” (Nitz, in Kasitipradit 1997 ). Instead
of providing security, the Chakri Naruebet becomes another asset in need
of protection. In fact, the carrier might make a negative net contribution
in a naval war, demanding resources and requiring defense while provid-
ing very little positive output. Large naval vessels can tie down a large
number of escorts even when not directly participating in the fighting. By
1917 , for example, the British navy was employing some 280 destroyers
to hunt U- boats and escort convoys in the Atlantic. At the same time, a
