The Price of Prestige

84 chapter three

hundred more were languishing aimlessly with the North Sea battle fleet

waiting to escort battleships to a battle that never took place. A quarter

of Britain’s destroyers were constrained by the need to protect the large

battleships (Kennedy 1989 , 178 ). This is a likely scenario for the Chakri

Naruebet as well.

While the Chakri Naruebet is an asset with questionable strategic value,

the Thais do not hesitate to cash in on its diplomatic value. Thailand chose

the naval base in Satthip as the backdrop for the negotiations between Sri

Lanka and the Tamil Eelam. Hosting the talks was deemed “important

for Thailand’s prestige,” and there was no better place for signaling Thai

prestige than the home of the Chakri Naruebet, the only aircraft carrier

in Southeast Asia (Chongkitthawon 2002 ). While Thai spokesmen vehe-

mently deny that prestige played any role in Thai procurement decisions,

defense analysts disagree (NAVINT 2001 , 8 ). In the months following the

Asian monetary crisis, arms suppliers in Bangkok did not expect a sharp

reduction in Thai purchases.

One reason for the optimism that the Thai military will continue doing business

with its traditional suppliers, say industry observers, has much to do with the

Thai military’s spending habits. “Prestige is an important factor for the Thai

military. They like sophisticated and expensive weapons.” (Pathan 1997 )^28

United States

In 2001 , a Pentagon- sponsored war game simulated war between the United

States and China. In the simulation, China tried to invade Taiwan to force

reunification, and the US Navy rushed to the island’s defense. One of the

most resounding conclusions of this simulation was the ineffectiveness of

aircraft carriers in such a scenario. All of the three carrier groups that were

sent to aid Taiwan had to stay far away from the shore to avoid the threat

of Chinese antiship missiles. From this distance, the carrier’s jets were un-

able to reach mainland China and hence were left out of the game (Prasad

2002 ; Boot 2006 ). The symbolic value of the carriers enhanced their strate-

gic vulnerability: “the effects of a single Chinese cruise missile hitting a U.S.

carrier, even if it did not sink the ship, would be politically and psychologi-

cally catastrophic, akin to al- Qaeda’s attacks on the Twin Towers” (Kaplan

2005 ).

This war game was part of an extensive strategic review conducted

by Andrew Marshall, director of net assessment of the United States