the aircraft carrier club 87
the carrier: China cannot be a great power without acquiring a carrier,
the ultimate great- power status symbol (Pu and Schweller 2014 ; Diamond
2006 ).^30 Indeed, until the launching of the Liaoning, China was the only
permanent member of the UN Security Council who was not also a mem-
ber of the carrier club. The 2004 tsunami relief effort, in which Chinese
ability to offer assistance was significantly hampered by lack of naval avia-
tion, clinched the carrier advocate camp’s ability to muster enough sup-
port to jump-start an ambitious procurement program (Ross 1997 ; Kristof
1993 ; Kaplan 2005 ; Erickson and Wilson 2006 ; Sakhuja 2000 ).
In strategic terms the Chinese carriers are not likely to be game chang-
ers. The exact condition of Liaoning, a refitted Soviet carrier, is unclear.
In November 2013 , a leaked Canadian document offered a critical assess-
ment of the Liaoning’s capabilities. Even according to Chinese sources, at
the time of the report’s writing, only five pilots had completed their car-
rier training. The Canadian document suggests that even this number was
inflated. Even when fully operational, the small fleet of aircraft carried by
the Liaoning is not likely to be effective in any significant future confron-
tation (Westhead 2013 ). The main role of this carrier is likely to be as a
training platform. China purchased two other Russian carriers, the Minsk
( 1998 ) and the Kiev ( 2000 ) and turned them into tourist attractions (as
part of theme parks and, in the case of the Kiev, as a luxury hotel) after
a detailed study of their design (Diamond 2006 , 41 ). The design of the
local carriers is still not clear. Given China’s lack of experience, we may
expect relatively small ( 10 , 000 – 25 , 000 - ton) carriers. However, as Erickson
and Wilson ( 2006 ) note, prestige considerations may push the Chinese to
adopt bigger and bolder designs. Indeed, recent reports suggest that the
new carriers are likely to be in the 50 , 000 - ton range. Yet building the car-
rier is just the first step. A carrier requires a flotilla of escorts as part of a
cohesive carrier group. It also requires trained and experienced naval and
air crews. Training for naval aviation is a dangerous and costly endeavor:
“In 1954 alone, in working to master jet aviation off carriers, the US Navy
lost nearly eight hundred aircraft. In 1999 the Navy lost only twenty- two,
but these were the most advanced aircraft flown by the world’s most expe-
rienced aviators” (Erickson and Wilson 2006 , 53 ). Naval aviation, there-
fore, imposes significant cultivation restrictions that are likely to affect
Chinese capabilities for a while. Any immediate effect of Chinese carrier
procurement will therefore be political rather than strategic.
Most observers frame the future Chinese carrier in categorical terms:
by procuring an aircraft carrier, China is finally asserting its role as a bona
fide great power. Prestige considerations make the carrier very attractive:
