chapter four

A Contest of Beneficence

Prosociality in International Relations

For we like to flatter ourselves by falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler motive, whereas in
fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self- examination, get entirely behind our covert
incentives, since, when moral worth is at issue, what counts is not actions, which one sees, but
those inner principles of actions that one does not see. (Kant [ 1785 ] 1997 , 19 – 20 )

W

hen commenting on ethics, Rabbi Hillel famously asked, “If I am

not for myself, who will be for me? If I am not for others, what

am I?” Hillel’s first question captures the concept of self- help, one of the

most often- cited characteristics of the international system (Waltz 1979 ;

Schroeder 1994 , 109 ; Mercer 1995 , 233 – 34 ). Yet Hillel does not stop with

self- help. His second question focuses on “other- help,” or prosociality.

This pair of normative maxims seems to offer contradictory prescriptions:

how can we observe other- help while practicing self-help? This tension

is especially pronounced in the self- proclaimed self- help environment of

international relations.

A quick survey of international politics provides many examples of ac-

tors that are involved in other- help. The forces of the United Nations Mis-

sion for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), for example,

currently consists of soldiers, policemen, and observers from thirty- three

countries including Mongolia, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Poland. Interna-

tional relations theory, with its emphasis on self- help, finds it difficult to

explain such prosocial behavior. What explains the participation of these

countries in this remote mission, which has already claimed fifteen fatali-

ties?^1 Helping others often consumes resources that are no longer available

for self- help. This is especially striking when life and limb are at stake. Thus,

the decision to consume prosocial goods, such as sending peacekeepers,