Feature: The future of pilot training
22 | Seaways | May 2019 Read Seaways online at http://www.nautinst.org/seawaysCauses and possible solutions to the groundings of vessels under the guidance of pilots
The future of pilot training
Kees Buckens FNI
Having the passage plan installed is as
important for the safety of the vessel as the
pilot ladder is for the safety of the pilot.
D
espite an ongoing focus on Bridge Resource Management
(BRM) and human element issues in maritime training,
accidents continue to happen. This paper focuses on
vessels that run aground when under control of pilots. In
a presentation given at the New Zealand Maritime Pilots Association
(NZMPA) conference in November 2018, Tim Burfoot, Chief
Accident Investigator with New Zealand’s Transport Accident
Investigation Commission (TAIC) said that, of 19 events investigated
by accident investigation organisations in the last few years, only one
was caused by technical failure. The last six accident reports published
by the TAIC all stated that technology was not used optimally.
Navigation in these cases was largely based on visual markers and there
was no shared mental model between pilot and bridge team. The
resulting loss of situational awareness was a major contributing factor to
the accident. This has caused growing concern, to the extent that both
the Australian Accident Transport Safety Board (ATSB) and TAIC have
put ‘navigating in pilotage waters’ on their respective watch lists.teams, in an attempt to make some sense of these groundings. Our
focus was on why the groundings continue to happen despite extensive
and ongoing pilot training. The following is a review that looks at
causes and possible solutions to prevent the groundings of vessels when
under the guidance of pilots.The Port Passage Plan
Much BRM training for pilots has a focus on communication and on
creating a shared mental model with the bridge team (if there is no
shared mental model, there is no BRM). Whereas communications
techniques such as closing the loop and thinking aloud are practised
fairly well, at least by the pilots, to achieve a shared mental model
between the pilot and the bridge team there is a need for an extensive
Master-Pilot exchange (MPX) upon the pilot boarding the vessel.
For this MPX to be successful, the port’s detailed port passage plan,
including heading and speed for each leg of the route and radii for
every turn, must be installed in the vessel’s ECDIS or navigation
computer before the vessel’s arrival at the pilot station. The pilot
must have the same plan loaded on the PPU together with the vessel’s
particulars and manoeuvring characteristics.
To create a port passage plan from the pilot station to each individual
berth in the port requires that all pilots in the port agree on a common
route to bring a vessel to a particular berth. A good example of this can
be seen in the port of Auckland.
When the pilots have agreed on these detailed passage plans, these
plans must be communicated with the visiting vessels. Our case study
teams suggest that rather than making these plans available for down
loading, they should be proactively forwarded to the ship. The message
should include a requirement that the plan is installed in the ECDIS
(as per IMO resolution A.893), and that the vessel will not be able to
enter the port until this is done. A pilot will not board if the pilot ladder
is not presented appropriately, and we believe that having the passage
plan installed is as important for the safety of the vessel as the pilot
ladder is for the safety of the pilot.
With the port passage plan installed on both the vessel’s ECDIS and
the pilot’s PPU, the MPX should be concise and focus on amendments
to the plan due to the particular manoeuvring characteristics of the
vessel and other variable conditions. This may require a wider turn,
an earlier wheel-over line position, an adjusted speed, or similar fine
tuning of the plan. As a result of this action the bridge team and the
pilot will now conduct the port approach from the same plan which
facilitates a shared mental model.Incident reports discussed here are:
Vasco de Gama – 22 August 2016 UK MAIB 23/2017
L’Austral – 9 January 2017 NZ TAIC MO-2017-201
Azamara Quest – 27 January 2016 NZ TAIC MO-2016-202
Maersk Garonne – 28 February 2015 ATSB 319-MO-2015-002
Aquadiva – 12 February 2017 ATSB 330-MO-2017-002
Navios Northern Star – 15 March 2016 ATSB 325-MO-2016-003Most groundings with a pilot on board involve an alteration of
course. From the Vasco de Gama in Southampton to the L’Austral in
Milford Sound, the Azamara Quest in Tory Channel or the several
recent groundings in Australia (see box), in every incident the vessel
deviated from the planned track while altering course. Over time
there has been little change in the causation of accidents involving an
alteration of course, as demonstrated by voyage data recorder (VDR)
analysis. The pilot typically sees the accident as a misjudged turn, a
loss of situational awareness or a result of incorrect perception when
not piloting from the centreline. The investigator on the other hand
uses incontrovertible VDR evidence as the basis for their reports, rather
than relying on interviews with pilots and bridge teams, which are seen
as unreliable. The investigator expects to see a detailed passage plan,
good BRM, the full use of the Portable Pilot Unit (PPU) and of all
available bridge equipment. This can be seen in the ATSB report on
the contact with a navigation buoy of the Navios Northern Star. In the
latter incident, the pilot was criticised for placing the PPU in the front
bridge window while conning from behind the radar, from where he
could not see the PPU.
In November/December 2018 I conducted a number of case studies
with groups of pilots, master mariners and with navigators in full bridge