40 TheEconomistNovember 2nd 2019
1A
s its so-called caliphate expanded
across Syria and Iraq, Islamic State (is)
promised its followers an apocalyptic bat-
tle to come. Eager jihadist propagandists
predicted that a final victory over the “cru-
sader armies” would usher in the day of
judgment and give birth to a new world.
The man who was to lead that battle, the
self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Bagh-
dadi, instead blew himself up in a tunnel in
Syria on October 26th, murdering two of
his own children as he died.
His suicide, to avoid capture by Ameri-
can forces, marks the end of an era for is.
The group once held sway over millions of
Syrians and Iraqis in an area the size of Brit-
ain. It had already lost its territory, clawed
back at staggering cost by a mix of Ameri-
can air power, Syrian militiamen and Iraqi
troops. Now it has lost its leader as well.
Yet this does not mark the end of is. The
group endures as a low-level insurgency in
parts of Syria and Iraq, carrying out attacks
(see map on next page) and preying on ci-
vilians to fund its operations. It has also
diversified, with a string of wilayats(prov-
inces) around the world. Though it maynever again hold so much territory, it will
remain a threat. And the conditions that al-
lowed it to rise—a region of corrupt, sectar-
ian and ineffective governments that lord
over poor, alienated populations—have, if
anything, grown worse.
Mr Baghdadi kept a low profile (see
Obituary). After he ascended the pulpit of a
Mosul mosque in 2014 to declare a caliph-
ate, he would not be seen in public for five
years. Charisma mattered less than ambi-
tion. Even Osama bin Laden, the former
leader of al-Qaeda, thought it premature to
establish a caliphate. By taking advantage
of the chaos of Syria’s civil war to seize ter-
ritory, Mr Baghdadi made his movement
influential enough to draw tens of thou-
sands of followers from around the world
(some of whom, allegedly, are pictured
above in a Syrian prison).
His death will disrupt is, but perhaps
not for long. In a forthcoming book Jenna
Jordan of the Georgia Institute of Technol-
ogy examines over 1,000 cases involving
the killing or capture of leaders of terrorist
or insurgent groups. She says three factors
contribute to a group’s resilience after-wards: its degree of bureaucracy, ability to
draw on local resources and ideological
zeal. These qualities ensure that its mis-
sion does not depend on a single leader.
isranks highly on all three. It has kept
meticulous records and exported its proce-
dures to international franchises that can
apply them independently. Though it no
longer pulls in $1m a day, as it once did, it
still has deep pockets, and is likely to bene-
fit from local Sunni disaffection in Syria, as
Bashar al-Assad’s reviled forces fill the vac-
uum left by President Donald Trump’s re-
treat. Its ideological purity resonates inde-
pendently of Mr Baghdadi. As a result, is
“should ultimately choose a successor eas-
ily and recover quickly,” says Ms Jordan. In-
deed, it has proved its resilience before. Mr
Baghdadi rose to the top because two pre-
decessors were killed in American strikes
in 2006 and 2010.
It is unclear who might succeed him.
The group has yet to acknowledge his death
on social-media channels used by follow-
ers. Most of his lieutenants are shrouded in
secrecy. One of them, Abu al-Hassan al-
Muhajir, the group’s spokesman, can be
ruled out as a candidate: he was killed in a
separate raid the following day.
Regardless of who leads it, isis keen to
rebuild, which might explain why Mr Bagh-
dadi died in Idlib, far from his former re-
doubt in north-east Syria and western Iraq.
In theory this was inhospitable ground.
The province is a frequent target of Syrian
and Russian air strikes and is dominated by
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (hts), a former affili-Islamic StateDecapitated, not defeated
ISTANBUL AND RIYADH
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is dead, but his ultra-violent jihadist group lives onMiddle East & Africa
41 Lebanon’scrisis
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