40 The Question of an Eternal Helljust this). Even if a sinner's deeds were infinitely evil in every
objective sense, as Hitler's were-utterly devoid, that is, of any
residual quality of rational goodness - still the intentionality
of a finite will, aboriginally prompted into action by a hunger
for the Good, could never in perfect clarity of mind match the
sheer nihilistic scope of the evil it perpetrates. Nor could any
rational will that has ever enjoyed full freedom -which means
a full rational awareness both of its own nature and of the na-
ture of the Good as such- resist the love of God willfully for
eternity. (But, again, this will be addressed below.)
Here, though, I have to note that it is a thoroughly mod-
ern and wholly illogical notion that the power of absolutely
unpremised liberty, obeying no rationale except its own spon-
taneous volition toward whatever end it might pose for itself,
is either a real logical possibility or, in any meaningful sense,
a proper definition of freedom. An act of pure spontaneity on
the part of a rational being, if such a thing were possible, would
also be a pure brute event, without teleology or rational termi-
nus, rather like a natural catastrophe. The will in such an even-
tuality would be nothing but a sort of spasmodic ebullition,
emptily lurching toward-or, really, just lurching aimlessly in
the direction of-one chance object or another, without any
true purpose. A choice made without rationale is a contra-
diction in terms. At the same time, any movement of the will
prompted by an entirely perverse rationale would be, by defi-
nition, wholly irrational- insane, that is to say- and therefore
no more truly free than a psychotic episode. The more one is
in one's right mind-the more, that is, that one is conscious
of God as the Goodness that fulfills all beings, and the more
one recognizes that one's own nature can have its true comple-
tion and joy nowhere but in him, and the more one is unfet-
tered by distorting misperceptions, deranged passions, and the