Doubting the Answers 53
worth pointing out, and it multiplies that absurdity by an in-
finite sum in claiming that this fabulous power of free choice
could ever eventuate in a rejection of God extending into eter-
nity. But the far deeper problem with the infernalist orthodoxy,
as far as I am concerned, is the exceedingly obvious one that
the idea of an eternal hell, no matter what terms one uses to de-
fend it, forces one to accept certain conclusions about God-
understood both as the free creator of the world and as the
only possible transcendental end of the natural rational will-
that ultimately render a vast number of traditional Christian
doctrines and moral claims totally empty. And, in fact, this
is where I begin in the meditations that follow: not from the
question of creaturely freedom, which can be deferred to the
end, but rather from that of divine goodness (which, it turns
out, is nowhere near so simple a matter as one might think).
III
Sometimes childish imagery-even childish anthropomor-
phisms- can have a certain convenient power for elucidating
things that should be clear already, but often are not. Take a
clear example: Christ instructs his followers to think of God
on the analogy of a human father, and to feel safe in assuming
that God's actions toward them will display something like-
but also something far greater than -paternal love. "Is it not
the case that no man among you, if his son should ask for a
loaf of bread, would give him a stone? Or, if he should also ask
for a fish, would give him a serpent? If you, therefore, who are
wicked, know to give good gifts to your children, how much
more will your Father in the heavens give good things to those
who ask him" (Matthew 7:9-11; cf. Luke 11:11-13). Moreover,
Ephesians 3:14-15 identifies God's as a universal fatherhood,