2019-11-09_The_Economist

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The EconomistNovember 9th 2019 BriefingMacron’s view of the world 19

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ly saying is: “Wake up!” With America turn-
ing its back, China rising, and authoritar-
ian leaders on the eu’s doorstep, the result
is “the exceptional fragility of Europe”, Mr
Macron concludes, “which, if it can’t think
of itself as a global power, will disappear.”
“What we are currently experiencing,”
he declares, with reference to the with-
drawal of troops from Syria, is “the brain-
death of nato”. Pressed to explain, he ar-
gues: “You have no co-ordination whatso-
ever of strategic decision-making between
the United States and its natoallies. None.
You have an unco-ordinated aggressive ac-
tion by another natoally, Turkey, in an
area where our interests are at stake.” Did
this mean that Article Five—the idea that if
one natomember were attacked the others
would come to its aid, which underpins the
alliance’s deterrence—is still functional? “I
don’t know,” he replies. “But what will Arti-
cle Five mean tomorrow?”
The underlying message is brutal: Eu-
rope has to stop judging these times a his-
torical anomaly, start asking whether nato
is fit for purpose, and get its act together.
This is a view broadly shared by his coun-
trymen (see chart 1). “Even if we don’t want
to hear it,” he says, “we cannot in all re-
sponsibility fail to draw the conclusions, or
at least begin to think about them.”

His business is philosophy
Mr Macron, a philosophy graduate as well
as a former investment banker, is consid-
ered to be more of a thinker than most
world leaders. He tries to read for an hour
or two each day. In Shanghai he slipped off
for a private lunch with Chinese artists to
muse about freedom. Mr Macron’s deliber-
ations have led him to conclude that what
is needed is “European sovereignty”: the
collective ability to defend Europe’s inter-
ests—over security, privacy, artificial intel-
ligence, data, the environment, industry,
trade and so forth—in a strategic way.
During his interview, Mr Macron roams
across topics, moving from a psychological
portrait of Vladimir Putin one moment to
the perils of a low-interest-rate economy
the next. Europe faces an almost-existen-
tial moment, he argues, as the world shifts
from a global order based on rules to one
determined by muscular power politics.
Yet he does not seem to be daunted. He has
a more engaging manner than his aloof
public persona, which has led to a reputa-
tion for haughtiness, would suggest. Mo-
ments such as when Mr Macron told off a
teenager for not calling him “Monsieur” in
2018, or when he said in 2017 that railway
stations were places where “one crosses
people who succeed, and people who are
nothing”, have added to this impression
that he is arrogant and removed. And, in-
deed, the bleakness of Mr Macron’s analy-
sis is matched by an uncanny—and no
doubt excessive—confidence in his own

ability to do something about it.
But can he? French Fifth-Republic pres-
idents are fond of laying out sweeping vi-
sions of the world that appeal to the coun-
try’s grandeur. Over the years, when French
leaders have called for a Europe puissance
(European power), this has often sounded
suspiciously like code for French hege-
monic ambitions. Such efforts in the past
have been dismissed in London or Wash-
ington as quaint, or dangerously under-
mining of nato, or both. In 2003 during the
Iraq war, when France, Germany, Belgium
and Luxembourg held talks on such mat-
ters, their get-together was dismissed as a
second-rate “chocolate summit”.
Yet there are new reasons to try to un-
derstand the thinking in Paris. Mr Macron
is an energetic diplomat, keen to shape the
events he sees unfolding. For at least the
next year, and possibly beyond, he will be
the only ambitious leader of a liberal de-
mocracy who is also at the head of a nuclear
power, with a military presence that
reaches from Europe to the Pacific, a unSe-
curity Council seat, strong executive pow-
ers and a robust parliamentary majority.
Compare this with the agonies of Brexit
Britain, Germany’s dysfunctional coalition
and faltering economy, or the political pa-
ralysis of Italy and Spain.
The result could be that leadership in
Europe could pivot to France. By default as
well as inclination, says Benjamin Haddad
of the Atlantic Council in Washington, dc,
Mr Macron is well placed to become Eu-
rope’s new diplomatic leader.
For sure, Mr Macron cannot compete
with Mrs Merkel on experience. But, mid-
way through his term, the 41-year-old
French president has built up ties to many
world leaders. Since taking office, Mr Mac-
ron has made 101 trips to over 50 different
countries, including places (from Nigeria
to India) outside France’s traditional
sphere. His China trip was his second there
as president. On his watch, Mr Trump has
been four times to France. Even Mr Mac-
ron’s domestic standing has started to re-
cover, having taken a bruising soon after
coming into office. After the searing social
unrest led by thegilets jaunes(yellow jack-

ets) a year ago, his approval rating—still
very low, at 34%—is at least back up to
where it was before the protests began. (Mr
Trump’s is at 41% and over the past three
years has not slipped below 36%.)
Moreover, despite some clumsy foot-
work, Mr Macron has manoeuvred a num-
ber of France-friendly appointees into top
eu jobs. They include Ursula von der
Leyen, the new head of the European Com-
mission; Charles Michel, the incoming
European Council president; and Christine
Lagarde, who now runs the ecb. And France
has secured a hefty new commission port-
folio spanning the single market, industri-
al policy, digital, defence and space—al-
though he failed to secure Sylvie Goulard
for the job, after she became the first
French candidate to be rejected by meps in
Brussels for being unfit to take office.
Some of the language in Europe has
started to shift in Mr Macron’s direction, at
least. Mrs von der Leyen says she wants to
run a “geopolitical” commission. Mark
Rutte, the Dutch prime minister, has ar-
gued that “the eu needs a reality check;
power is not a dirty word.” Mrs Merkel has
told Europeans that, when it comes to their
collective security, “the times when we
could rely on others are over.”

Flown east of the sun
By the third day of his trip, French officials
were pleased that a deal to protect regional
European food labels—such as Roquefort
blue cheese—in China, and vice versa, had
been signed and that China seemed sup-
portive on climate change. But they were
also candid about how difficult it all is.
China is a good test of whether Mr Mac-
ron can get Europe to speak as one voice,
and whether Europe wants that voice to be
Mr Macron’s. He has been outspoken about
“China’s real diplomatic genius for playing
onour divisions and weakening us”. He
says he wants fellow Europeans to be less
naive; he has argued it was “stupid” to sell
essential infrastructure in southern Eu-
rope to the Chinese. He also wants the euto
insist on reciprocity in trade and market
access, and to guard against technology
transfer. To back this up with a show of lim-
ited muscle, France sails at least twice a

Nearly there^2

Source:IISS

Defence spending ,2018,%ofGDP
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.
United States
Britain
Poland
France
Italy
Germany

NATO target

On the defensive^1

Source:ECFR *March 2019

“Where would you rather your country spend its
defence budget - investing in the defence
capabilitiesofNATOor the EU?”, % polled*

0 1020304050
France
Germany
Italy
Poland

NATO EU
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