The Peninsula Campaign
In the hands of an aggressive Union commander, a seaborne landing on the Virginia Peninsula might
have been a bold and imaginative way to attack the Confederate capital, Richmond. But a hesitant,
over-cautious execution made General George B. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign slow and unsuccessful.
CLASH OF ARMIES 1862begin an advance up the Peninsula to
Richmond, and thousands more were
arriving. In front was a Confederate line
on the Warwick River at Yorktown,
lightly manned by 14,000 troops. In
Washington, Lincoln, afraid that
McClellan’s move had left the capital
exposed to a surprise attack, urged
the general to make haste with an
immediate assault on the Warwick River
defenses, but McClellan dismissed this as
military naïveté. Johnston later
commented: “No one but McClellan
would have hesitated to attack.”Johnston’s reverse
Consistently overestimating Southern
strength, McClellan was obsessed by the
notion that his forces were insufficient.
Lincoln’s later decision to hold back
troops to defend Washington and
counteract Jackson’s campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley only fed McClellan’s
belief that he was being starved of
resources. On the other side of the line,T
he Virginia Peninsula is a tongue
of land stretching east from
Richmond, between the York
River to the north and the James River
to the south. Eager to exploit Union
command of the sea, General McClellan
originally planned to transport his troops
from Washington along the Potomac
River into Chesapeake Bay for a landing
at Urbanna on the Rappahannock River.
Having bypassed the Confederate army
at Manassas, south of Washington, he
would then have a relatively clear run
at the Confederate capital. Yet Southern
General Joseph Johnston’s retreat south
of the Rappahannock in March 1862
forestalled him. Instead, the Union
Army of the Potomac landed at Fort
Monroe on the tip of the Virginia
Peninsula. By April 4, McClellan had
almost 60,000 troops with which toBEFORE
The armies confronting one another in
Virginia at the start of 1862 were both
commanded by generals who were regarded
as too negative-minded by their presidents.SOUTHERN ANTAGONISM
In March 1862, Confederate general Joseph E.
Johnston withdrew his army from Bull Run
❮❮ 60–61. This retreat, together with the
destruction of many supplies, was initially
carried out without informing President
Davis. Johnston’s obstinacy angered Davis, and
on March 13, General Lee assumed the role
as his military adviser.MCCLELLAN’S DETERMINATION
Lincoln repeatedly urged an offensive to
break through the Confederate line between
Washington and Richmond. General George
B. McClellan, commanding the Army of the
Potomac, instituted his own plan to outflank
the Confederate defenses and take Richmond.Artillery at Yorktown
The battle for Yorktown in April–May 1862 was largely
an artillery duel. McClellan was confident his guns were
superior to those of the enemy and was hesitant to attack
Confederate fortifications without prior reconnaissance.Army of the Potomac
McClellan established a vast camp for his 120,000-
strong army on the banks of the Pamunkey River near
Richmond in May 1862. This panoramic view by James
Hope shows McClellan riding in the foreground.JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON
Virginian Joseph Eggleston Johnston was
quartermaster general of the U.S. Army in
April 1861 when he resigned to serve
the Confederacy. Although made a full
general by Davis, he developed a lasting
feud with the Confederate president.
When he was wounded at Seven Pines
in May 1862, Davis replaced him with
Robert E. Lee. After his recovery,
Johnston held a series of commands in
the Western Theater. His cautious attitude
repeatedly enraged Davis, but his skill in
conducting a retreat demanded respect.
Surviving the war, he was elected for a
term in Congress in 1878.Confederate General Johnston was CONFEDERATE GENERAL 1807–91
equally—but more rationally—convinced
of the weakness of his army. In mid-
April, Johnston took command at
Yorktown, and planned to abandon
the Peninsula and concentrate his forces
in front of Richmond. On May 3, the
Confederates abandoned Yorktown and
the Warwick River defenses. Breaking
contact with the enemy in a deftly
executed maneuver, Johnston’s troops,
now numbering some 50,000, fell back
toward Richmond. A part of the army
was designated to fight a holding action
on a defensive line at Williamsburg, and
on May 5 this inflicted a reverse on
pursuing Union troops. The fiercely
fought encounter was almost as costly
for both sides as the First Battle of
Bull Run, despite the engagement of far
smaller forces.Cautious approach
McClellan advanced up the Peninsula at
a snail’s pace along muddy roads. His
army took two weeks to march 50 miles
(80km) from Williamsburg, before setting
up camp near Richmond between the
Pamunkey and Chickahominy rivers.
McClellan called for reinforcements.
Lincoln refused to send any by sea, but
he did order a 40,000-strong corps under
Irvin McDowell to advance overland
from Fredericksburg to join the Army of
the Potomac. Much to McClellan’s anger,
this move was canceled in response to
Jackson’s victory at Winchester in theThe number of pages in
a letter sent by General
McClellan to President
Lincoln, rejecting the
president’s proposal for an overland
offensive against Richmond in 1862.