between Burnside and Richmond
except the 400-ft (122-m) wide river.
Bridging this obstacle had been given
high priority in the planning, with
urgent orders for pontoons to be sent,
but these floating bridges were delayed.
Giving Lee time
Burnside would not send troops across
fords because he anticipated that rising
water levels might
render them
impassable, and he
did not want to
find himself with
part of his army cut
off on the other side of the river. So he
waited for the pontoons, which gave Lee
the time to assemble his troops. When all
the bridging equipment had arrived at
the end of the month, the two halves of
Lee’s army—General James Longstreet’s
and General Stonewall Jackson’s
corps—were facing Burnside’s soldiers
M
ajor General Ambrose Burnside
was not eager to command the
Army of the Potomac, feeling
that he lacked the competence required
of an army commander. Even so, within
days of taking charge he responded to
Lincoln’s demand for offensive action
with a plan to seize Richmond, the
Confederate capital. He would shift his
force rapidly and abruptly to cross the
Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg,
driving toward the town before General
Robert E. Lee could react. Lincoln
favored fighting Lee’s army rather than
sidestepping it, but approved the plan.
Burnside’s maneuver was finely
executed. On November 15, his army
of 120,000 men, organized into three
“Grand Divisions,” set off on a march
that caught the Confederates by
surprise. Within two days, Union troops
were streaming into Falmouth, on the
opposite bank of the Rappahannock
from Fredericksburg. Nothing stood
BEFORE
After the Battle of Antietam, Lincoln was
determined that McClellan’s Army of the
Potomac should pursue the Confederates
into Virginia and seek to inflict defeat.
NORTHERN ADVANCE
General Lee’s first thought after Antietam was
also to return to the offensive ❮❮ 132–133.
Only the poor condition of his Army of Northern
Virginia persuaded him to rest and refit.
Meanwhile General McClellan, goaded by
Lincoln, began reluctantly moving his army
across the Potomac in late October 1862.
Incensed by his delays and lack of offensive
spirit, as well as his insubordinate attitude
toward the government, Lincoln fired
McClellan on November 7, appointing Major
General Ambrose Burnside in his place.
across the river. Because of the long
delay, both sides had plenty of time to
prepare their positions. Burnside placed
his artillery above Fredericksburg on
Stafford Heights to the east—such a
weight of firepower that not even Lee
could contemplate taking the offensive.
On the other side of the river,
Longstreet took up position on Marye’s
Heights behind the town, amassing a
formidable concentration of artillery
and infantry along the base of the ridge,
while Jackson spread out his forces
downstream to his right. Lee had a
panoramic view of the battlefield from
a nearby hilltop. In all, the Confederate
troops ranged
across 8 miles
(13km) of ridges
along the western
side of the valley.
A frontal assault
on such prepared defenses, held by
more than 70,000 men, many of
whom had a clear view of the plain
beneath them, was unlikely to
succeed. But Burnside felt committed
to the operation and would not call it
off. On the morning of December 11,
the bridging of the river began.
Burnside with his staff
Alexander Gardner—from Mathew Brady’s studio—
took this photograph of Burnside (seated, center) in
November 1862, prior to Fredericksburg.
The number of enemy
that General Robert E. Lee
reported he had taken prisoner following
the Battle of Fredericksburg.
900
Burnside Takes the Offensive
Given command of the Army of the Potomac, Union general Ambrose Burnside launched a swift
offensive to seize Richmond that caught the Confederate forces off guard, but the operation ended
in Union defeat at Fredericksburg in one of the most one-sided battles of the Civil War.