ORGANIZING FOR THE FIGHTWinfield Scott’s retirement in late 1861
helped trigger unprecedented changes in
the size and scale of American warfare—and
a new man eager to take his place.FLAWED SUCCESSOR
The new general-in-chief was George B.
McClellan, who had been unashamedly
scheming to replace his elderly but still
clear-minded predecessor. McClellan would prove
to be a flawed choice for the command,
combining a deficit in moral courage with
arrogance. Yet he remained a talented organizer,
and his background in railroad management
66–67 ❯❯ matched his talent for logistical
organization. His strategic concept for besieging
the Confederate army was also fundamentally
sound, even if he failed to execute it properly.GIANT ARMIES
Scott’s retirement pointed the way forward to
armies of unparalleled size that would now
wage war across the continent. Future battles
would be giant confrontations where, for
example, a total of more than 113,000 men
clashed at Antietam 132–33 ❯❯ and more than
111, 0 0 0 a t G e t t y s b u r g 180–83 ❯❯.McClellan put his army through a
reasonably coherent training program;
he also benefited from the North’s
relative abundance of equipment.
Despite his hesitancy in committing
troops in battle, McClellan had a real
talent for organizing an army. He also
played a major role in choosing
the senior leaders of his
force. The officers he
selected for command
would remain
influential long after his
departure. While the
western Federal armies did
not have the same spit and
polish as McClellan’s eastern
showpiece, they had better
organization and greater
resources than their
Confederate opponents.
The Confederate army
facing McClellan did not
receive the same systematic
training, but it did benefit
from a large number of
Virginia Military Institute
graduates who supplemented
the cadre of regular officers.
What later became the Army
of Northern Virginia also had
a disproportionate share of
officers from West Point Military
Academy compared to the western
Confederate armies.
For Civil War armies, training
centered on close order drill, which
provided the methods they used to
move from one position to another on
the battlefield. The intensely regimented
system of drill evolutions allowed units
to maintain their organization and
coordinate the firing of their weapons.
Unfortunately, officers received little
formal instruction in how to use terrain
or what sorts of movements were most
advantageous in which circumstances.
Even so, rudimentary training
through parade-ground drill was
better than no training at all,
and McClellan’s program
also included some target
practice, mock battles,
and training marches.Mixed results
The Union Army of
the Potomac’s mixed
performance on the
battlefield proved that
excellence on the parade
ground did not necessarily
translate into victory.
Indeed, McClellan’scautious temperament had a stronger
influence on the Army of the Potomac’s
command culture than did his training
program. As Lieutenant Colonel
Alexander S. Webb put it after the
Battle of Chancellorsville, his hesitancy
helped to create an army in which most
of the leaders were “cautious, stupid and
without any dash.” They “delay 20,000
men ... in order to skirmish with 20 or
30 cav[alr]y and one piece of art[iller]y.AFTER
Winfield Scott’s “Anaconda Plan”
Scott advocated winning the war by a gradual strategy,
likened to the crushing attack of a snake, based on
blockading the South’s ports and then cutting it in two
with offensives up and down the Mississippi River.WINFIELD SCOTT
Union powder flask
Older flintlock weapons
primed by loose powder
were still used in the early
part of the Civil War.They all think the enemy wiser and
braver and quicker than themselves
and such men should not command.”
Webb would not have attributed
this failing to McClellan’s temperament,
but the Army of the Potomac did have
an overly defensive mindset, which
would remain a problem even after
General Ulysses S. Grant took over
command during the Overland
Campaign in summer 1864.Commissioned in 1808, Winfield Scott led a
division in the Anglo-American War of 1812,
helped professionalize the army after the
end of that war, and conquered Mexico City
in 1847 with his brilliant Veracruz Campaign.
This victory made possible the acquisition of
Mexican territories, such as California and
New Mexico, in the American Southwest,
leading to political disputes about slavery’s
status in these areas. At the outbreak of
the Civil War, Scott was general-in-chief.
Rheumatic, gout-ridden, and weighing
more than 300lbs (136kg), he was no
longer able to take battlefield command.
He resigned on November 1, 1861.UNION GENERAL (1786–1866)