Competition Without CatastropheSeptember/October 2019 109
get in line. Washington should start shaping the parameters o these
debates without further delay. Finally, coexistence with China does not,
and cannot, preclude the United States from speaking out against Chi-
na’s egregious and inhumane treatment o its own citizens and the arbi-
trary detention o foreign nongovernmental organization workers. The
West’s relative silence on Beijing’s internment o Uighurs has left a
moral stain, and so the United States and its partners should mobilize
international pressure to demand neutral third-party access to those who
are detained and the sanctioning o the individuals and companies that
are complicit in the detention. China may well threaten that such pres-
sure will destabilize ties. Yet Washington should make speaking out on
human rights abuses a predictable and routine part o the relationship.
SEQUENCING COMPETITION AND COOPERATIONIt is often taken as an article o faith that as the U.S.-Chinese rela-
tionship becomes more competitive, the space for cooperation will
shrink, i not disappear. But even as adversaries, the United States
and the Soviet Union found ways to cooperate on a number o issues,
including space exploration, contagious diseases, the environment,
and the global commons. The need for cooperation between Washing-
ton and Beijing is far more acute, given the nature o contemporary
challenges. Leaders in both countries should consider cooperation on
such transnational challenges not as a concession by one party but as
an essential need for both.
To get the balance between cooperation and competition right,
Washington has to consider the sequencing o each. The United States
has historically sought to cooperate ¿rst and compete second with
China. Beijing, meanwhile, has become quite comfortable competing
¿rst and cooperating second, linking—either explicitly or implicitly—
oers o cooperation to U.S. concessions in areas o strategic interest.
Going forward, Washington should avoid becoming an eager suitor
on transnational challenges. Eagerness can actually limit the scope for
cooperation by making it a bargaining chip. Although it may seem
counterintuitive, competition is likely essential to eective coopera-
tion with Beijing. In the zero-sum strategic mindset o many Chinese
ocials, perceptions o U.S. power and resolve matter enormously,
and the Chinese bureaucracy has long focused on shifts in both. Given
this sensitivity, it can be as important for Washington to demonstrate
an ability to stand ¿rm, and even to impose costs, as it is for it to speak