Winning the Peace in IraqSeptember/October 2019 165
tegrated in the face o ’ oensive. Some Sunnis, alienated by years
o sectarian governance under the Shiite prime minister Nouri al-
Maliki, welcomed forces as liberators. By the summer o 2014,
many feared that the group would take Baghdad.
Alarmed by ’ advance, Iran was the ¿rst country to come to
Baghdad’s aid—by June, it had begun sending aid, equipment, and ad-
visers from the Quds Force, a unit o its Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. Then, in September 2014, Maliki stepped down in favor o
Abadi, a pro-U.S. moderate who worked to soothe Sunni fears o per-
secution. That same month, the United States formed a global coali-
tion to defeat . Washington and its coalition partners provided Iraq
with military assistance in the form o training, equipment, battle¿eld
advisers, and air power. But it was the Iraqis who did the ¿ghting.
The fact that the Iraqis provided most o the troops to defeat in
Iraq was essential to restoring the country’s morale. The government
did receive outside help—Iran backed Iraqi Shiite militias, and Qasem
Soleimani, the leader o the Quds Force, became a ubiquitous presence
in Iraq during the war. Yet the major military gains in the anti-
campaign were made, with coalition assistance, by the Iraqi army and
especially the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, an elite, nonsectarian
force funded, trained, and supported by the United States since 2003.
UNSTEADY PROGRESS
Iraq has defeated on the battle¿eld, but it has not yet won the
peace. The country now faces the massive task o reconstruction. The
Iraqi government, assisted by the £ Development Program and the
U.S.-led coalition, has returned basic services to places such as eastern
Mosul, which was devastated by heavy ¿ghting in 2016 and 2017. But
western Mosul and other areas still resemble the bombed-out cities o
Europe at the end o World War II.
At an international donor conference last year, Iraq secured some
$30 billion in aid, loan, and credit pledges. Yet the government has
estimated that recovery and reconstruction could cost as much as $88
billion. The task will take a decade or more, provided the Iraqi gov-
ernment and international donors remain committed to rebuilding
Sunni areas. Without consistent progress in this eort, hope will wane
and discontent will grow. Already, there are worrying signs that the
momentum for ensuring Iraq’s stabilization and security has begun to
stall. I it does, it could augur a return to a full-blown insurgency.