Foreign affairs 2019 09-10

Linda Robinson

168 μ¢œ¤ž³£ ¬μ쬞œ˜

indistinguishable. The Iraqi government agrees that the militias should

be broken up but understands that, given Iran’s clout, doing so will take

some time and deft maneuvering. One aspect o‘ that maneuvering will

be to distinguish Iranian-backed militias from groups o‘ Shiite volun-

teers who were largely motivated by patriotism. Many Ÿ«μ ¿ghters

have already gone home, but over 100,000 remain on the government’s

payroll. Some groups have become en-

trenched and are allegedly involved in

extortion and other illegal activities.

The Iraqi constitution bans political

militias—a provision that has wide pop-

ular support. In addition, Abdul-Mahdi

issued a decree in July 2019 that called

on all entities bearing arms to be incorporated into the armed forces.

As the Ÿ«μ is already legally part o“ Iraq’s armed forces, this decree

could serve as a vehicle for dissolving the Iranian-backed militias—

something Abadi had sought to do with a previous order. Carrying out

this decree, however, will require building a powerful coalition in par-

liament, likely with the Sadrists in the lead.

The Ÿ«μ is a separate issue. It is unlikely to be disbanded outright.

Thanks to the Ÿ«μ’s achievements in the anti-ž˜ž˜ campaign, it is po-

litically popular, especially among Shiites. The problem is that the

Ÿ«μ’s o”cial role is redundant, overlapping with that o‘ the Ministry

o‘ the Interior’s police force, which already struggles to attract enough

quali¿ed recruits. Since Ÿ«μ ¿ghters receive the same pay and bene¿ts

as police o”cers, they have little incentive to join the federal police.

This issue can be best addressed over time, as part o‘ an eort to pro-

fessionalize the entire armed forces o“ Iraq.

Instead o‘ engaging with their Iraqi colleagues to ¿nd workable

solutions, however, o”cials in the Trump administration seem intent

on alienating them. Senior U.S. policymakers apparently believe that

Iraqis are hostile to the United States, ungrateful for its help, and be-

holden to Iran. When I spoke to one U.S. diplomat recently, he noted

that almost one-third o“ Iraq’s current parliamentarians had been de-

tained by U.S. forces at some point before 2011. The implication was

that they could not be trusted. But since 2003, the United States has

often worked with former combatants in Iraq and encouraged their

reintegration into mainstream politics. Abadi’s interior minister,

Qasim al-Araji, was a former U.S. detainee, yet he worked closely with

Despite the progress it has

made in recent years, Iraq

is in a delicate position.