Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis
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issue. That such an accord has not materialized has brought creeping
disappointment and doubt about the relationship’s long-term viability.
Critics carp that the United States has overinvested in India—that
the favors accorded to New Delhi have not been worth the return.
They point, for instance, to India’s failure to select a U.S. ¿ghter for
its air force or to its inability to conclude the nuclear reactor pur-
chases promised under the breakthrough nuclear agreement. Even
supporters o the partnership occasionally chafe at how long bilateral
engagement has taken to produce the expected fruits. The Trump
administration has taken such frustration further, focusing less on In-
dia’s potential as a partner than on its unbalanced trade with the
United States. It recently withdrew India’s privileged trade access to
the United States under the Generalized System o Preferences pro-
gram, churlishly announcing the decision just hours after Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi was sworn into oce for a second
time following his spectacular victory in elections this past spring.
Both critics and supporters o the U.S.-Indian relationship seem to
agree that the new engagement between the two democracies has not
yielded the alliance-like bond once hoped for. These complaints are
o the mark. Since the turn o the century, India has become a strong
supporter o the U.S.-led international order, despite showing no in-
terest in an alliance with Washington. I the United States’ aim is to
turn India into a close ally, formal or otherwise, it will come to grief.
Instead, Washington and New Delhi should strive to forge a partner-
ship oriented toward furthering common interests without expecting
an alliance o any kind. Simply put, the success o U.S. eorts in India
should be measured not by what India does for the United States but
by what India does for itself: i New Delhi puts in the economic and
political work to make itsel a major power—especially at a time o
growing Chinese inÇuence—Washington’s ambition to sustain what
then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice once called “a bal-
ance o power that favors freedom” will have been satis¿ed in Asia.
To achieve that goal, U.S. and Indian ocials alike must think
about the relationship dierently. Ultimately, the greatest obstacle to
a deeper partnership is wishful thinking about what it can achieve.STRATEGIC ALTRUISM
U.S.-Indian relations underwent a dramatic change soon after Bush
assumed the presidency, in 2001. After decades o alienation, Bush’s