Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis
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tory—such as the possibility o improved U.S. relations with Russia, a
longtime Indian ally, and more restraint in the use o force abroad, giv-
ing India more sway to advance its vision o a multipolar global order. It
was also believed that Trump might put less pressure on India regarding
its climate policies and its relations with Pakistan.
Above all, India’s fundamental security calculus hasn’t changed. Lead-
ers in New Delhi are still convinced that China is bent on replacing the
United States as the primary power in Asia, that this outcome would be
exceedingly bad for India, and that only a strong partnership with the
United States can prevent it. As one senior Indian policymaker told us,
China’s rise “is so momentous that it should make every other govern-
ment reexamine the basic principles o its foreign policy.”
New Delhi particularly worries that China is encircling India with a
“string o pearls”—a collection o naval bases and dual-use facilities in
the Indian Ocean that will threaten its security. A Chinese-funded
shipping hub in Sri Lanka and a Chinese-controlled deep-water port
in Pakistan have attracted particular concern. China has also invested
$46 billion in a segment o its Belt and Road Initiative that crosses
through Kashmir, which is claimed by both India and Pakistan. China’s
economic, political, and military support for Pakistan, India’s enemy o
seven decades and adversary in three major wars, suggest that China is
working to establish a local counterweight to India.
India has also watched with growing alarm as China has illegally mili-
tarized its arti¿cial islands in the South China Sea, opposed Indian mem-
bership in the £ Security Council, and blocked India’s entry into the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, an international organization o nuclear sup-
plier countries committed to nonproliferation. China claims a huge swath
o Indian territory in the Himalayas, questions Indian sovereignty over
Kashmir, and last year triggered a military stando with Indian troops in
Bhutanese territory. In Tibet, China has been constructing dams that
could potentially limit the Çow o water into India, which would exacer-
bate water scarcity and complicate Çood control in India’s plains.
India’s response to the growing Chinese threat has been to develop its
own capabilities, including military ones. But the Indian government rec-
ognizes that only the United States has the power necessary to prevent
China from becoming an Asian hegemon in the decades ahead. As a re-
sult, fostering ties with the United States remains India’s topmost foreign
policy priority. This openness to U.S. inÇuence stands in sharp contrast
to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s calls for “the people o Asia to run the