Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis
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to come to its aid in the event o a major crisis with China. These
worries are compounded by the suspicion that the United States un-
der Trump is too internally divided to muster the strength, unity, and
resolve necessary to compete with China in the long term. Trump
has also initiated trade wars with allies such as Japan and the ¤, and
Indian policymakers are now grappling with Trump’s punitive trade
measures against India; in late 2018, Trump labeled India “the tari
king.” Likewise, given that the Trump administration has taken cru-
cial policy decisions regarding North Korea’s nuclear program with-
out consulting South Korea or Japan, who is to say that Washington
will be forthcoming on issues o vital interest to India? The adminis-
tration’s approach to peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, which
has failed to consider Indian interests, has already driven this point
home in New Delhi. Trump has largely ignored the imperative o
protecting U.S. alliances in Asia in the face o China’s rise—despite
the continent’s centrality in the policy documents issued by his own
administration. Trump, it appears, cares for little beyond major Asian
nations’ trade balances with the United States. He has opted instead
to invest heavily in personal relationships with autocrats such as Xi
and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump’s mercurial personal-
ity, which leaves the credibility o his commitments in doubt, and the
departure o India’s supporters, such as former Defense Secretary
James Mattis, from the administration have only made matters worse,
despite recent eorts by Secretary o State Mike Pompeo to correct
the drift in U.S.-Indian relations.
The uncomfortable question facing Indian policymakers is whether
they can continue banking on the cooperation o a Washington that
appears to have abandoned the liberal international order and evinces
little enthusiasm for continued strategic altruism toward New Delhi.
Although they want a stronger relationship with Washington—in part
because Modi has already expended much capital on this cause—they
have already started diversifying India’s international portfolio and re-
pairing New Delhi’s relations with Beijing and Moscow. In June 2018,
Modi himsel used a major international address to revive the concept
o “strategic autonomy,” a hoary Indian locution that has traditionally
stood for seeking good relations with the United States without alien-
ating China or Russia. The fact that Modi has opted for such geopo-
litical hedging, knowing full well that the strategy would not protect
India in the face o increased Chinese hostility, speaks volumes about