Michael O’Hanlon
200 μ¢¤³£ ¬μμ¬
relatively minor incursion, failed to honor their Article 5 promises, it
could lead to existential doubts about the core purpose o the alliance.
Or, as suggested above, China might occupy one or more o the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. These worthless islets are claimed by both
China and Japan. The United States takes no ocial position on who
should control the islands but acknowledges that Japan now administers
them and that its security treaty with Japan should therefore apply to
their defense. Such a complex, muddled situation is ripe for deterrence
failure. Beijing might try to seize one o the islands in order to signal,
without crossing the threshold o serious aggression, to Japan and the
United States that it is unhappy with some aspect o the postwar order
in the Paci¿c. Beijing might hope that it could force Japan into negotia-
tions and some type o humiliating compromise or drive a wedge be-
tween Tokyo and Washington that would make Japan feel more exposed,
and less self-con¿dent, on other issues in the years to come, thereby
opening up East Asia and the western Paci¿c to Chinese domination.
This type o limited enemy assault would raise dicult questions
for U.S. policymakers—what I call “the Senkaku paradox.” Should
Washington risk a great-power—and potentially nuclear—conÇict in
order to preserve its credibility, even over something relatively unim-
portant? Or should it conclude that the stakes are too small to justify
such a risk? In the event o limited enemy aggression against an inher-
ently worthless target, a large-scale U.S. response—as the traditional
approach to extended deterrence would dictate—would seem massively
disproportionate. On the other hand, a nonresponse would be unac-
ceptable, and inconsistent with American treaty obligations, too.
The way out o this paradox is through a strategy o asymmetric
defense. The United States should not formally renounce the possibil-
ity o a full military response to very limited (and quite possibly non-
lethal) aggression against its allies. Indeed, Lieutenant General John
Wissler, then commander o the U.S. III Marine Expeditionary Force
in Japan, was right to insist in 2014 that the United States and Japan
could expel the Chinese from the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands i required.
As a practical matter, however, the United States needs other options—
for both before and after a crisis begins.
Most o all, Washington’s deterrence strategy should seek to avoid
drawing ¿rst blood against another great power i at all possible. The
United States should prepare responses to small-scale aggression that
emphasize economic warfare, and sanctions in particular. At ¿rst, the