Foreign affairs 2019 09-10

Can America Still Protect Its Allies?

September/October 2019 201

main role o U.S. military force should be to create a defensive perim-

eter so that China’s or Russia’s appetite for expansion is not further

whetted. In the event that a crisis worsens, Washington and its allies

could attempt indirect military measures—for instance, targeting

ships in the Persian Gul carrying oil to China. This sort o response

would, at least initially, keep the con€ict far from the shores o any

great power, providing more time for the belligerents to avoid further

escalation. But economic warfare should be the core o the strategy,

with military force in support.

Such an approach would help convince a would-be adversary that it

would have more to lose than to gain from the use oƒ force—especially

i the United States and its allies had taken proper preparatory mea-

sures to ensure that they could tolerate any reprisals. The trick would

be to make sure the punishments for noncompliance were commensu-

rate with the initial aggression, while maintaining the potential to es-

calate i necessary.

For sanctions to be economically sustainable, the United States and

its allies need to understand vulnerabilities in their supply chains, …-

nancial dealings, and other economic relationships. They should de-

velop strategies to mitigate these vulnerabilities—for example, by

bolstering their national defense stockpiles o† key minerals and met-

als, many o which today come primarily from China. They should

take steps to avoid becoming overly dependent on China for key man-

ufactured components and goods—Washington could prevent Chi-

nese imports from exceeding a speci…ed percentage o certain critical

sectors. European states should also continue improving the infra-

structure needed to import lique…ed natural gas from the United

States and other countries as a backup in case energy imports from

Russia are interrupted in a future crisis.

A sanctions-based strategy would be judicious and proportionate,

but it would not be weak. Indeed, iƒ Beijing or Moscow refused to ei-

ther back down or otherwise resolve the dispute once the United States

and its allies had deployed sanctions, Washington could raise the stakes.

Recognizing that the aggressor state’s strategic aims had become fun-

damentally untrustworthy or hostile, Washington could seek to not

only punish the perpetrator for its speci…c action but also limit its fu-

ture economic growth. Over time, export controls and permanent

sanctions could replace temporary punitive measures. This strategy

would require support from key U.S. allies to be e‘ective—one more

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