The Sources of Chinese ConductSeptember/October 2019 93
The U.S. economy is also intertwined with the Chinese economy in
ways that would have been unimaginable with the Soviet economy. As
Kennan knew well, economically speaking, the Soviets did not need to
be contained; they contained themselves by refusing to join the world
economy. China is very dierent, since about one-third o its ³² growth
can be traced to exports, and the United States is its largest trading part-
ner. Attempting to disentangle the United States’ economy from China’s
through political means, such as travel restrictions, technology bans, and
trade barriers, will not work, unless a de facto state o war makes economic
interaction impossible. In the short run, taris could create a more level
playing ¿eld, but in the long run, they may end up advantaging China
by making it more self-reliant, to say nothing o the damage they would
inÇict on American prestige. And so the rivalry with China will have to
be managed within the context o continued economic interdependence.
Finally, China’s leaders have some international cards to play that
the Soviets never held. Compared with the class-based politics Moscow
was peddling during the Cold War, China’s appeals for global unity on
such issues as climate change, trade, and inequality could ¿nd far
greater traction abroad. That would be ironic, given China’s pollution,
protectionism, and economic disparities. But because the United States
has failed to take the lead on any o these issues, China’s communist
government may be able to convince foreigners that authoritarian gov-
ernments handle such problems better than democracies do.
FOCUSING THE AMERICAN MIND
The sources o Chinese conduct, along with the current global role o
the United States, point to a rivalry o a dierent kind than the one
Kennan saw coming in 1946 and 1947. The risk o immediate war is
lower, and the odds o limited cooperation are higher. But the danger
that nationalism will fuel ever-widening circles o conÇict is proba-
bly greater, and China’s determination to hack away at the United
States’ position in Asia is more tenacious than anything Stalin ever
attempted in Europe. I the United States wants to compete, it must
prepare for a long campaign for inÇuence that will test its own ability
for strategic prioritizing and long-term planning. That is especially
true given that fast-moving economic and technological changes will
make a traditional containment policy impossible—information travels
so much more easily than before, especially to a country like China,
which does not intend to cut itsel o from the world.