Competition Without CatastropheSeptember/October 2019 97
means to clear ends will allow U.S. policy to drift toward competition for
competition’s sake and then fall into a dangerous cycle o confrontation.
U.S. policymakers and analysts have mostly, and rightly, discarded
some o the more optimistic assumptions that underpinned the four-
decade-long strategy o diplomatic and economic engagement with
China (which one o us, Kurt Campbell, detailed in these pages last
year, writing with Ely Ratner). But in the rush to embrace competition,
policymakers may be substituting a new variety o wishful thinking for
the old. The basic mistake o engagement was to assume that it could
bring about fundamental changes to China’s political system, economy,
and foreign policy. Washington risks making a similar mistake today, by
assuming that competition can succeed in transforming China where
engagement failed—this time forcing capitulation or even collapse.
Despite the many divides between the two countries, each will need
to be prepared to live with the other as a major power. The starting point
for the right U.S. approach must be humility about the capacity o deci-
sions made in Washington to determine the direction o long-term de-
velopments in Beijing. Rather than relying on assumptions about China’s
trajectory, American strategy should be durable whatever the future
brings for the Chinese system. It should seek to achieve not a de¿nitive
end state akin to the Cold War’s ultimate conclusion but a steady state o
clear-eyed coexistence on terms favorable to U.S. interests and values.
Such coexistence would involve elements o competition and coop-
eration, with the United States’ competitive eorts geared toward se-
curing those favorable terms. This might mean considerable friction
in the near term as U.S. policy moves beyond engagement—whereas
in the past, the avoidance o friction, in the service o positive ties,
was an objective unto itself. Going forward, China policy must be
about more than the kind o relationship the United States wants to
have; it must also be about the kinds o interests the United States
wants to secure. The steady state Washington should pursue is rightly
about both: a set o conditions necessary for preventing a dangerous
escalatory spiral, even as competition continues.
U.S. policymakers should not dismiss this objective as out o reach.
It is true, o course, that China will have a say in whether this outcome
is possible. Vigilance will thus need to remain a watchword in U.S.-
Chinese relations in the period ahead. Although coexistence oers
the best chance to protect U.S. interests and prevent inevitable ten-
sion from turning into outright confrontation, it does not mean the end