The Economist USA - 26.10.2019

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The EconomistOctober 26th 2019 43

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n october2017 Faustin Archange Toua-
déra was in a difficult spot. The president
of the Central African Republic (car), one
of the world’s poorest and most fragile
countries, was struggling to quell a dozen
or so militias that threatened his regime. A
year earlier France had withdrawn troops
from its former colony. An arms embargo
meant that the government of carcould
not equip its own soldiers. Short of op-
tions, Mr Touadéra did what desperate Afri-
can leaders sometimes do: he turned to
President Vladimir Putin of Russia.
The impact was swift. Within weeks a
mining and a security company linked to
Yevgeny Prigozhin, Mr Putin’s crony, were
reportedly registered in Bangui, the capi-
tal. That December Russia successfully lob-
bied for the arms embargo to be lifted. Soon
after, it dispatched weapons and mercenar-
ies to shore up Mr Touadéra’s regime, as
well as a former gru(military intelligence)
operative to act as the president’s security
adviser. A few months later Lobaye Invest,
the mining company, won concessions to
look for gold and diamonds. When three
Russian journalists tried to investigate

their country’s shady operations in car
they turned up dead in July 2018.
Mr Putin would like to have the world
believe that his country’s approach to the
continent is about more than chicanery. To
that end, on October 23rd and 24th, Rus-
sia’s president hosted more than 40 Afri-
can leaders at a first-of-its-kind summit in

Sochi. As at the triennial summit of African
leaders hosted by China, which the Sochi
summit aped, there was much talk of trade
and investment. “We have a lot to offer to
our African friends,” said Mr Putin, ahead
of the event. But Russia’s actions in car—
and in other weak states—capture the na-
ture of its operations in Africa much better
than the rhetoric of Mr Putin, who over-
states his country’s influence.
Russia has a long history of intervening
in Africa. Its volunteers fought the British
in the second Boer war. During the cold war
the Soviet Union inculcated post-colonial
leaders in Marxism-Leninism and backed
liberation movements in countries such as
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau,
often as part of proxy wars with the West.
Russia’s ambitions shrank after the So-
viet Union collapsed. But over the past de-
cade, and especially after America and the
European Union imposed sanctions on
Russia related to its annexation of Crimea
in 2014, the Kremlin has viewed Africa as
an increasingly important arena. Since
2015 a dozen African leaders have visited
Russia. From 2006 to 2018 Russia’s total
trade with sub-Saharan Africa increased by
336%. It is the largest arms exporter to the
continent, accounting for 39% of deliveries
in 2013-17 (many from Russia to Algeria).
Judged by the displays at Sochi, more
will soon be on the way. “I didn’t know it
would be a gun show,” says a Mauritanian
businessman surveying the hall. There was
weaponry all around: helicopters, tanks
and missiles to shoot at helicopters and

Russia in Africa

The art of darkness


JOHANNESBURG AND SOCHI
Vladimir Putin flaunts Russia’s influence in Africa. But the country is not as
important as his spin suggests

Out to Africa

Sources: SIPRI; IMF

*Measures value of arms transfers, adjusted
for capability, rather than financial value

Russian exports to Africa

Arms exports, trend
indicator value*, bn

Total exports
$bn

0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

2007 10 15 18

0

5

10

15

20

2007 10 15 18

Middle East & Africa


45 Turmoil in South Africa’s opposition

44 Carving up northern Syria

46 Big protests in Lebanon

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