46 Middle East & Africa The EconomistOctober 26th 2019
T
heir grievancesare almost too many
to list: electricity shortages, undrink-
able water, collapsing infrastructure, a poi-
soned environment. The economy is stag-
nant and corruption is rife (see chart). But
it was WhatsApp that finally pushed the
people of Lebanon to the breaking-point.
Since October 17th many have joined a
spontaneous outburst of anger at a fossil-
ised political class. By some estimates
more than 1m people have come out to
demonstrate, in a country with fewer than
5m citizens. These are Lebanon’s largest
protests in almost 15 years.
The unrest began after the government
proposed to tax calls made via WhatsApp, a
messaging service. This is less trivial than
it sounds. Lebanon’s state-owned telecoms
sector is notorious for its high prices. A re-
port from 2017 by the economy ministry
found that local calls are five times more
expensive than in Jordan and 20 times
more than Egypt. Many Lebanese rely on
WhatsApp to keep in touch, both at home
and with a far-flung diaspora.
WhatsApp was the spark, but anger has
built for decades. Lebanon is almost a car-
icature of poor governance. It spends $2bn
a year (4% of gdp) to subsidise a power
company that cannot provide 24-hour
electricity. Internet connections are both
expensive and among the world’s slowest.
After a garbage crisis in 2015 left rubbish
piling up in the streets, companies began
dumping it in the sea, spoiling the Mediter-
ranean beaches. The government struggled
to control wildfires that burned across the
scenic Chouf mountains earlier this
month, because its firefighting helicopters
were grounded for lack of spare parts.
Mismanagement means the govern-
ment is short of funds, which makes it hard
to introduce reforms. The hated phone
company contributed $1.3bn, or 12% of gov-
ernment revenues, in 2017. And with public
debt at more than 150% of gdp, there is lit-
tle money for investment. Merely servicing
the debt consumes 45% of revenue.
The government has found ever pettier
ways to squeeze a few dollars out of taxpay-
ers. A budget approved earlier this year im-
posed a levy on, among other things, hoo-
kah pipes. As one protester from the
northern city of Akkar quipped, “Tomor-
row they’ll stick meters on our backsides”
and tax people for using the toilet (though
he put it rather more crudely).
Protesters have been calling for the res-ignation of the prime minister, Saad Hariri.
He has ignored them. Though one of his co-
alition partners has quit the cabinet, the
rest of Mr Hariri’s ministers are staying.
Mr Hariri asked for 72 hours to discuss
economic reforms. Given that his cabinet
has yet to implement reforms to unlock
$11bn in aid pledged at a conference in Paris
in April 2018, the public was understand-
ably sceptical. A satirical news programme
suggested that the government fixing the
economy was about as likely as the lowly
Lebanese national team defeating Ger-
many in football.
The proposals that emerged from a cabi-net meeting on October 21st duly disap-
pointed. Mr Hariri promised no new taxes
in the 2020 budget and modest spending
on social programmes and housing loans.
There was vague talk of a committee to
study privatising telecoms and the electric
company, and of an anti-corruption body.
Ministers and mps also accepted a 50% pay
cut, a largely meaningless gesture, since
many of Lebanon’s top politicians are
worth tens of millions of dollars. None of
this appeased the protesters, who were
back in the streets hours after Mr Hariri’s
announcement.
Even before the unrest, Lebanon was
tipping toward economic crisis. Growth is
weak. A recent shortage of dollars, to which
the Lebanese pound is pegged, has caused
widespread anxiety. The central bank was
forced to intervene to prevent shortages of
basic goods. The chaos has made things
worse. Borrowing costs, already high, have
soared. The yield on a bond maturing in
2025 rose by 2.4 percentage points in five
days. Banks have been closed for almost a
week, and many Lebanese worry about a
run when they reopen. “Either he resigns,
or we become Venezuela,” says Mark Daou,
an activist.
The country’s economic problems have
deep political roots. The Taif accord, which
ended Lebanon’s long civil war in 1990,
created a sectarian power-sharing arrange-
ment that endures to this day. Warlords be-
came politicians with ample opportunity
for patronage. It was this, they warned, or
chaos. But the system has rotted from with-
in. Politicians took so much, and delivered
so little, that many Lebanese are eager to
cast them off and risk the unknown. The
protests have been decidedly non-sectari-
an. Perhaps this is Mr Hariri’s one accom-
plishment: he has united a factious coun-
try in disgust. 7CAIRO
A surge of public anger sends Lebanon’s politicians reelingProtests in LebanonMessage not received
All fired upLess to lootSources: IMF; Transparency InternationalLebanonGDP, % increase on
a year earlierCorruption-perception
index ranking
180=most corrupt02468102009 15 181451401351301251202009 15 18