Alina Polyakova and Benjamin Haddad120
But the Trump administration, with its confrontational stance, has al-
ready forfeited some o the inuence Washington used to have. By
forgoing its role as a trust builder among Europeans and, with the
United Kingdom’s decision to leave the
, losing its historic ally
within the community, the United States has seen most o its ability to
shape positive outcomes in Europe evaporate. Instead, it has focused
on building strong bilateral ties with individual countries, such as Ger-
many under Obama and Poland under Trump. A new U.S. president
might not label the European Union a “foe,” as Trump has. But merely
paying lip service to common values and shared history is unlikely to
translate into an increased willingness to protect European interests.
Observers should neither lament this state o aairs nor yearn for
what used to be. I Europe can choose its own path, the transatlantic
relationship will mature into a more balanced alliance. By 2030,
could be stronger and more capable than it is today. The
could take
military action to end future wars on its periphery. It could invest in
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Balkans, thus pushing back against
Chinese and Russian inuence there.
From developing best practices for the use o articial intelligence
to responding to unfair Chinese trade practices to ghting climate
change, the United States and Europe together are still indispensable
when it comes to shaping the norms and rules o tomorrow. The trans-
atlantic alliance is unlikely to look like it once did. There may be more
distance and distrust. Siblings often grow apart when they come o
age; they make choices, choose partners, and embrace careers that the
other doesn’t necessarily approve of. But in the end, the ties that bind
are stronger than the individual choices that divide.∂14_Polyakova_Blues.indd 120 5/20/19 3:35 PM