Susan Greenhalgh and Xiying Wang
174 μ£¥³¤ ¬μμ¬
in dierent major cities, multiplying
their impact.
Hong Fincher also relies on an
essentially psychological explanation to
account for the party-state’s reaction to
the feminist challenge. She portrays
this highly complex, internally dieren-
tiated institution as a monolith popu-
lated by male leaders whose emotions
(primarily fear) led them to crack down
on the activists. “The Chinese govern-
ment... reduces women to their roles
as dutiful wives, mothers and baby
breeders in the home, in order to
minimize social unrest,” she writes,
adding later that “China’s all-male rulers
have decided that the systematic subju-
gation o women is essential to main-
taining Communist Party survival.”
Gender subordination is indeed a
fundamental aspect o Chinese gover-
nance; however, many actors within the
system don’t seem to be aware o it.
That includes those in power and most
male elites and intellectuals, who seem
to believe that gender equality was
achieved long ago. A more satisfying
analysis than Hong Fincher’s would begin
by acknowledging the centrality o what
Chinese intellectuals starting in the late
nineteenth century referred to as “the
woman question” in China’s political
history, and would then examine the many
laws, policies, and programs that the
state has enacted over the years to ad-
vance women’s rights and gender equality.
Recent laws run the gamut, from the
Law on the Protection oÊ Women’s Rights
and Interests (1992), to the Law on
Maternal and Infant Health Care (1994),
to the Anti–Domestic Violence Law
(2016). These statutes have many Áaws,
including limited enforcement, but at
least they put worthy goals on the books.childhood trauma nor the domestic
violence they suered as adults made
them more likely to become feminists.
Rather than looking for clues in her
subjects’ childhoods to understand why
they rose up, Hong Fincher would have
done better to attend to the historical
context in which they came o age and
Áesh out the larger forces that shaped
their lives. Most o today’s young female
activists were born in the 1980s. As the
Ãrst generation born under China’s
one-child policy, they were the precious
daughters o their families, and they
reaped the rewards oÊ huge investments
made by the state and by Chinese
professionals seeking to create a cohort
oÊ healthy, well-educated, sophisticated
young people to lead China to prosperity
and power. They beneÃted from a
massive expansion o the educational
system and typically excelled at top
universities; quite a few went abroad for
advanced degrees. Many gained a feminist
consciousness by taking courses in
gender and feminist studies or by joining
projects organized by women’s rights
organizations. Eyes opened, it became
dicult to tolerate the pervasive dis-
crimination and the glass ceiling they
encountered in the workplace. Rather
than accept a life o disappointment, they
rejected the plans their parents and
teachers had for them—landing a good
job, Ãnding a good husband, and becom-
ing mothers—as too limited. They
chose instead to take the risky step o
making their voices heard. They were
aided in no small part by the rapid
expansion o the Internet and the rise
o social media. By skillfully document-
ing their activities and spreading their
messages via social media, they were
able to closely coordinate their actions