Jon Finer
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and to draw the most hawkish conclu-
sions possible from the mixed evidence
on Iraq’s pursuit o weapons o mass
destruction. Today, the Trump adminis-
tration is reportedly pressuring the
intelligence community, which has long
judged that Iran is in strict compliance
with the nuclear deal, for assessments
that would bolster the case for a Ãrmer
approach. “The Intelligence people
seem to be extremely passive and naive
when it comes to the dangers o Iran.
They are wrong!” Trump tweeted earlier
this year. In May, with the administra-
tion pointing to intelligence indicating
that Iran might be planning attacks
against U.S. forces, anonymous U.S.
ocials warned that the threat was being
hyped. “It’s not that the administration
is mischaracterizing the intelligence, so
much as overreacting to it,” one told
the The Daily Beast. In addition, as in
2003, the United States is increasingly
isolated from all but a small handful o
countries that support its approach.
It is unclear whether this brinkman-
ship will lead to conÁict, stalemate, or
renewed dialogue. Regardless, some
contemporary realities should drive
decision-making. Iran is roughly four
times as large as Iraq in terms o territory
and has roughly four times the popula-
tion Iraq had in 2003. Iran’s geography
is more complex than that o Iraq, and
its governance is at least as challenging.
Although Iran menaces its neighbors
and funds terrorist proxies, Washington
has yet to articulate any threat to the
United States severe enough to justify a
war and lacks clear legal authority to
wage one. For these and other reasons,
not even the most bellicose proponents
o confronting Iran have suggested a
full-scale assault.But in May, after Washington took a
series o provocative steps, Rouhani
announced that Iran would begin
reducing its adherence to some o its
commitments under the deal, particu-
larly with regard to the stockpile o
enriched uranium it is allowed to
maintain, and would set a two-month
deadline for countries to provide Iran
with relie from U.S. sanctions. He also
said that Iran was not abandoning the
deal and remained open to negotiations.
Although Trump has also said that he
is open to talks, the prospects o a
conÁict between the United States and
Iran are now as high as they have been
since early 2013, before the nuclear
negotiations began to progress, when
there were frequent reports that both
countries (and Israel) were preparing for
a military clash. It is easy to imagine any
number o incendiary scenarios. U.S.
forces are currently deployed in rela-
tively close proximity to Iranian troops
or their proxies in at least three coun-
tries: Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. A missile
strike from Iranian-backed forces in
Yemen that killed a large number o
Saudis or a fatal rocket attack against
Israel launched by Iranian proxies in
Lebanon or Syria would lead to heavy
pressure on Washington to retaliate,
perhaps against Iranian targets.
There are also profound similarities
between the current situation and the
period that preceded the U.S. invasion
o Iraq, starting with an impression-
able president, inexperienced in world
aairs. In the aftermath o the 9/11
attacks, the Bush White House pushed
the intelligence services to look for
evidence o Iraqi involvement—none
materialized, and there had been
hardly any reason to suspect it would—