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Jessica Chen Weiss

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tional norms, protecting state sovereignty against what it sees as un-

lawful humanitarian interventions. China’s growing economic clout

has also led other states, particularly those in Africa and Latin Amer-

ica that trade heavily with China, to join Beijing in opposing human

rights resolutions in the š¤ General Assembly.

But China has not always used its power in the š¤ Security Coun-

cil to defend authoritarian states from

international pressure. It has voted

several times for š¤ sanctions resolu-

tions against Iran and North Korea

and has pushed other countries, in-

cluding Myanmar and Sudan, to curb

political violence. “Despite its equivocations,” the political scientist

Joel Wuthnow has pointed out, “China cannot be simply described as

a patron o” rogue regimes.”

For example, in the early years o” this century, when the Sudanese

government was carrying out a campaign o” genocidal violence in

Darfur, China sold weapons to the regime and tried to temper inter-

national sanctions. But under international pressure in advance o” the

2008 Beijing Olympics, China prevailed on Khartoum to accept a

peacekeeping force that included Chinese peacekeepers.

In 2011, Beijing surprised many international observers by voting

for sanctions against Libya and in favor o” referring the Libyan dic-

tator Muammar al-Qaddaà to the International Criminal Court.

China then chose not to block a š¤ Security Council resolution au-

thorizing the military intervention in Libya that led to QaddaÃ’s vio-

lent ouster. Having learned from that experience, during the civil

war in Syria, China has reserved its veto for those resolutions it be-

lieves threaten forcible regime change. China’s overall approach to

the š¤ reÁects a conservative position on the balance between sover-

eignty and human rights, tempered by a desire to avoid the political

costs o” taking unpopular stands.

Critics often accuse Beijing o” supporting authoritarian countries

by providing them with unconditional loans and aid. There is some

truth to this claim, but the picture is more complicated than critics

usually suggest. China’s o–cial development assistance tends to fol-

low its political interests rather than target particular types o” govern-

ments according to their level o” democracy or corruption. China also

provides an attractive alternative source o• Ãnance to governments

Neither China’s economic

nor its political model is

well suited for export.