Let Russia Be RussiaNovember/December 2019 141raised the prospect o an enormous entity on Russia’s borders that, like
the United States, would dwar Russia in population, wealth, and
power. Psychologically, Europe remains central to Russia’s great-
power sensibilities. For the past three centuries, Russia has demon-
strated its prowess on Europe’s great battleÄelds and through its
grand diplomatic conferences. After the defeat o Napoleon in 1814,
for example, it was the Russian emperor Alexander I who received
the key to the city o Paris. Europe’s consolidation and the continued
expansion o £¬¡¢ have had the eect o pushing Russia out o Eu-
rope and diminishing its voice in continental aairs. And so the
Kremlin has accelerated eorts to exploit the fault lines within and
between European states and to stoke doubts in vulnerable £¬¡¢
members about their allies’ commitment to collective defense.
In the Middle East, Russia has returned after an absence o some
30 years. At Ärst, Putin intervened in Syria both to protect a long-
standing client and to prevent the victory o radical Islamist forces
with ties to extremists inside Russia. But after saving Assad and see-
ing the absence o a strong U.S. role, his ambitions grew. Russia de-
cided to use the Middle East as an arena to showcase its great-power
credentials. Largely bypassing the £-sponsored peacemaking pro-
cess, in which the United States is a central player, Russia has teamed
up with Iran and Turkey to seek a Änal political resolution o the crisis
in Syria. To reduce the risk o a direct conÁict between Iran and Israel,
Russia has strengthened its diplomatic ties to Israel. It has rebuilt
relations with Egypt and worked with Saudi Arabia to manage oil prices.
It has also grown closer to China in developing a strategic counter-
balance to the United States. This relationship has helped Russia
resist the United States in Europe and the Middle East, but the
greater concern for Washington should be how it enhances Beijing’s
capabilities. Russia has aided China’s commercial penetration o Cen-
tral Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the Middle East. It has
given China access to natural resources at favorable prices and has
sold the country sophisticated military technology. In short, Russia is
abetting China’s rise as a formidable competitor to the United States.
Moscow’s more assertive foreign policy today is a reÁection not o
the country’s growing strength—in absolute terms, its power hasn’t
increased much—but o the perception that U.S. disarray has magniÄed
Russia’s relative power. The country’s behavior is also driven by a per-
sistent fear that guides Russian foreign policy: the sense that in the long