Foreign Affairs - 11.2019 - 12.2019

(Michael S) #1
Let Russia Be Russia

November/December 2019 143

an opening for a comprehensive resolution o‘ the crisis. Two tradeos
are essential. First, to allay Russian concerns, the United States should


tell Ukraine that £¬¡¢ membership is o the table, while deepening
bilateral security cooperation with Kiev. Second, Kiev should recog-
nize Russia’s incorporation o‘ Crimea in exchange for Moscow’s
acceptance o‘ the full reintegration o‘ the Donbas into Ukraine with-


out any special status. In a comprehen-
sive agreement, Ukrainians would also
receive compensation for lost property
in Crimea and Ukraine would be af-


forded access to oshore resources and
guaranteed passage through the Kerch
Strait to ports on the Sea o‘ Azov. The
United States and the ¤™ would incre-


mentally ease their sanctions on Russia as these arrangements took
eect. At the same time, they would oer Ukraine a substantial as-
sistance package aimed at facilitating reform in the belie‘ that a
strong, prosperous Ukraine is both the best deterrent against future


Russian aggression and a necessary foundation for more constructive
Russian-Ukrainian relations.
Such an approach would be met initially with great skepticism in
Kiev, Moscow, and elsewhere in Europe. But Zelensky has staked his


presidency on resolving the Donbas conÁict, and Putin would wel-
come the chance to redirect resources and attention to countering
spreading socioeconomic unrest in Russia. Meanwhile, European
leaders are suering from Ukraine fatigue and want to normalize rela-


tions with Russia while still upholding the principles o“ European
security. The time is ripe for bold diplomacy that would allow all sides
to claim a partial victory and accommodate the hard realities on the
ground: £¬¡¢ is not prepared to accept Ukraine as a member, Crimea


is not going back to Ukraine, and a separatist movement in the Don-
bas is nonviable without Moscow’s active involvement.
A smarter Russia strategy would also better reckon with the impli-
cations o‘ the Kremlin’s military intervention in the Middle East. It is


Iran—not Russia—that poses the main challenge there. When it
comes to Iran, Russia has diverging, but not necessarily opposing,
interests from those o‘ the United States. Like the United States,
Russia does not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons—that was why it


supported the nuclear deal with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan


After defeating Napoleon,
the Russian emperor
Alexander I received the
key to the city of Paris.
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