Beyond Great ForcesNovember/December 2019 153I Khamenei is the most obvious example o a leader who makes
the ultimate choice o which current to ride when the impersonal
forces are in conÁict, he is hardly the only one. In dierent circum-
stances, German Chancellor Angela Merkel plays the same role.
During the eurozone crisis, the international economic forces aect-
ing Germany consistently called for a more proactive approach to
Greece’s insolvency and the economic troubles o Germany’s other
eurozone partners. Yet Merkel instead took the more conservative
path, which resonated with Germany’s domestic politics, even though
this ended up dragging out the crisis. At the same time, on the issue
o refugees, she embraced liberal international norms and took in
hundreds o thousands o Syrians at a time when domestic politics in
Germany and the rest o Europe was turning against charity to
foreigners. Another chancellor might have made dierent choices:
indeed, the politician who held the number two position in Germany
at the time, Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, favored a more generous
approach toward the Greek government, but on refugees, he bowed to
domestic pressure and called for caps on admissions.
THE SURVIVORS
Bashar al-Assad and Nicolás Maduro are marked men. When it
comes to both Syria’s president and Venezuela’s, there are many
people who want them out o power, i not dead. And yet by re-
maining alive and in oce, they have compromised the best inter-
ests o their countries.
Both Syria and Venezuela are desperate nations, racked by internal
conÁict, tormented by starvation, shedding refugees in epic quanti-
ties, and beset by various external powers. There is nothing about the
power or the international position o either Syria or Venezuela that
has caused its anguish. Both suered a horriÄc breakdown in their
internal politics, but in both cases, there were Äxes that could have
been made long ago to end the misery. Getting rid o Maduro would
have been a huge step toward alleviating Venezuela’s pain, just as get-
ting rid o Assad could have made it possible to reach a compromise
to end the Syrian civil war.
It’s not that simple, o course: many Venezuelan elites, particularly
the military, are unwilling to depose Maduro, and many Syrian mi-
nority groups, particularly the ruling family’s own Alawite community,
feel the same way about Assad. Yet there is also no question that the