Martin Indyk
20 μ¢¤³£ ¬μμ¬
its gains or topple its regime. Maintain
the residual U.S. troop presence in Iraq
and Syria. Get back to the È¢¬ and
build on it to address other problematic
Iranian behavior, using measured sanc-
tions relie as leverage. Resolve the
dispute in the Gul Cooperation Council
and engage all the relevant parties to
try to end the conÁict in Yemen. Return
to the pursuit o an equitable resolution o
the Israeli-Palestinian conÁict, where
prospects for a breakthrough may be low
but engagement is necessary to preserve
the hope o a two-state solution down
the road. Treat Israel and Saudi Arabia
as crucial regional partners but not
subcontractors free to do whatever they
want. And instead o spurning interna-
tional consensus, try to shape it to align
with U.S. interests.
This alternative path might eventu-
ally lead to a successful renovation o the
grand project Kissinger began hal a
century ago. But i the United States
continues to follow Trump’s folly instead,
it should not be surprised to Änd itsel
alone in the desert, chasing a mirage.∂got the message: Trump likes to talk
war, but he doesn’t like to wage it. They
understood that he prefers making
deals. So they cleverly oered to start
negotiations. Sensing another made-for-
television summit, Trump jumped at
the oer and invited Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani to meet on the margins
o the £ General Assembly in Septem-
ber, saying o the Iranian problem, “We
could solve it in 24 hours.”
The about-face alarmed Trump’s
partners, especially Netanyahu, who
spoke out against it. The Saudis became
more circumspect in responding to the
September drone attack on their oil
Äelds. The Emiratis wasted no time in
hedging their bets, dispatching ocials
to Tehran to resume long-stalled
maritime security talks. For Trump’s
Middle Eastern partners, a meeting
between the impulsive and unpredict-
able U.S. president and the cool,
professional Iranian president was their
worst nightmare.
Almost three years into his term,
Trump has nothing to show for his
eorts to counter Iran or promote peace
in the Middle East. Instead, his policies
have fueled the conÁict between Iran
and Israel, alienated the Palestinians,
supported an unending war and a
humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and split
the Gul Cooperation Council, possibly
permanently.
There is another path the United
States could take in the region, an
approach far more conducive to the
interests o Washington and all its allies
and partners. It would require stepping
up U.S. diplomacy and scaling back
U.S. objectives to what can plausibly be
accomplished with the means available.
Contain Iran rather than try to roll back