Michael S. Doran
26 μ¢¤³£ ¬μμ¬
Egyptian-Israeli track, U.S. negotiators
pined for a comprehensive peace and a
full Israeli withdrawal from the West
Bank and Gaza. Carter’s national
security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
called it a “concentric circles approach.”
The idea, he explained in his memoirs,
was to begin working for “the Egyptian-
Israeli accord, then expanding the circle
by including the Palestinians on the West
Bank and Gaza as well as the Jordanians,
and Änally moving to a still wider circle
by engaging the Syrians and perhaps
even the Soviets in a comprehensive
settlement.”
The Carter team built the concentric
circles concept into the Camp David
accords, which contained both a bilateral
Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the
“Framework for Peace in the Middle
East.” This second document called for
“the resolution o the Palestinian
problem in all its aspects” and “full
autonomy” for the inhabitants o the
West Bank and Gaza, with the establish-
ment o “a self-governing authority”
that would then participate in Änal-
status negotiations. Thus was born the
peace process that would continue
forward for decades, all the way to Oslo
and beyond. Imprinted in its very ²£¬
was a utopian impulse to settle all the
conÁict in the Middle East by starting
with the Palestinian question.
The Carter administration believed
that the “Framework for Peace” was a
crucial part o the overall plan, providing
political cover to the Egyptians for
making peace with Israel. Sadat played
along with the “comprehensive settle-
ment” game so long as he needed the
Americans to pressure Israel to return
the Sinai to Egypt, but once he got
that, he displayed little interest in thePalestinian nationalism. He was certain
that i Israel could be compelled to give
back the occupied territories, the Arab
states would make peace—even Syria.
So his administration turned Kissinger’s
Bismarckian balancing into a driven
quest for a comprehensive peace, one in
which the Arab states bordering Israel
would negotiate a lasting settlement in
return for Israel’s withdrawal to its
pre-1967 borders and the creation o a
Palestinian homeland.
This policy put all the local parties
into an awkward situation. Whatever
they loudly proclaimed, the Arab states
had little interest in the Palestinians.
Washington’s embrace o the Palestinian
cause gave them some leverage against
Israel, but it also threatened to derail
progress on important bilateral con-
cerns. Sadat’s two goals in coming to
the negotiating table, for example, had
been to reclaim the Sinai and join the
American camp. Now Carter, hung up
on the Palestinians, was bringing the
Soviets into the talks as equals and
wanted to add Syria and the Palestine
Liberation Organization to boot—noth-
ing that would advance Sadat’s agenda.
So the Egyptian leader stole a march
and reshaped the diplomatic landscape.
On November 19, 1977, he became the
Ärst Arab leader to visit Israel, deliver-
ing his message o “no more war, no
more bloodshed” directly to the Knesset.
Carter felt blindsided, and he was
angry that his dream o a comprehensive
peace was receding. He eventually
turned his attention back to the bilateral
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. But he
chafed at the eort. And although the
administration scrapped plans for a new
Geneva conference, it never changed its
mindset. Even as they supported the