Robert Malley42 relative decline. There are also the
aftershocks o the recent Arab uprisings,
notably the dismantling o the regional
order and the propagation o failed
states. These are exacerbated by domes-
tic political changes: a new, unusually
assertive leadership in Saudi Arabia and a
new, unusual leadership in the United
States. All these developments fuel the
sense o a region in which everything is
up for grabs and in which opportunities
not grabbed quickly will be lost for good.
The United States’ key regional allies
are simultaneously worried about the
country’s staying power, heartened by the
policies o the Trump administration,
and anxious about them. The president
made it a priority to repair relations with
Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the ,
all o which had frayed under his prede-
cessor. But Trump’s reluctance to use
force has been equally clear, as has his
willingness to betray long-standing allies
in other parts o the world.
That combination o encouragement
and concern helps explain, for example,
Saudi Arabia’s uncharacteristic risk-taking
under the leadership o Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS:
its continuing war in Yemen, its blockade
o Qatar, its kidnapping o the Lebanese
prime minister, its killing o the dissident
Jamal Khashoggi. MBS perceives the
current alignment with Washington as a
eeting opportunity—because Trump
might not win reelection, because he is
capable o an abrupt policy swing that
could see him reach a deal with Iran, and
because the United States has a long-
standing desire to extricate itsel from
Middle Eastern entanglements. The
feeling in Israel is similar. The United
States’ partners in the region are both
seeking to take advantage o Trump’sattack on Saudi Arabia, a Palestinian
Islamic Jihad attack on Israel, or an Iraqi
Shiite militia strike on a U.S. target.
Saudi Arabia might misguidedly blame
Iran for every Houthi attack, just as Iran
might blame Saudi Arabia for any violent
incident on its soil perpetrated by internal
dissident groups. The United States
might be convinced that every Shiite
militia is an Iranian proxy doing Teh-
ran’s bidding. Israel might deem Hamas
accountable for every attack emanating
from Gaza, Iran for every attack ema-
nating from Syria, the Lebanese state
for every attack launched by Hezbollah.
In each o these instances, the price o
misattribution could be high.
This is no mere thought exercise: After
the attack on Saudi oil facilities in Sep-
tember, the Houthis immediately claimed
responsibility, possibly in the hope o
enhancing their stature. Iran, likely seeking
to avoid U.S. retaliation, denied any
involvement. Who conducted the opera-
tion and who —i anyone —is punished
could have wide-ranging implications.
Even in seemingly well-structured
states, the locus o decision-making has
become opaque. In Iran, the government
and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, the branch o the military that
answers directly to the country’s su-
preme leader, at times seem to go their
separate ways. Whether this reects a
conscious division o labor or an actual tug
o war is a matter o debate, as is the
question o who exactly pulls the strings.THREAT MULTIPLIERS
A series o global, regional, and local
transitions has made these dynamics
even more uncertain. The global transi-
tions include a newly present China, a
resurgent Russia, and a United States in07_Malley_Blues.indd 42 9/23/19 3:14 PM