Robert Malley
46 μ¢¤³£ ¬μμ¬
intersecting rifts, where local disputes
invariably take on broader signiÄcance,
will remain at constant risk o combusting
and therefore o implicating the United
States in ways that will prove wasteful
and debilitating. De-escalating tensions is
not something the country can do on its
own. Yet at a minimum, it can stop
aggravating those tensions and, without
abandoning or shunning them, avoid
giving its partners carte blanche or
enabling their more bellicose actions.
That would mean ending its support for
the war in Yemen and pressing its allies to
bring the conÁict to an end. It would
mean shelving its eorts to wreck Iran’s
economy, rejoining the nuclear deal, and
then negotiating a more comprehensive
agreement. It would mean halting its
punishing campaign against the Palestin-
ians and considering new ways to end the
Israeli occupation. In the case o Iraq, it
would mean no longer forcing Baghdad to
pick a side between Tehran and Washing-
ton. And as far as the Iranian-Saudi
rivalry is concerned, the United States
could encourage the two parties to work
on modest conÄdence-building mea-
sures—on maritime security, environmen-
tal protection, nuclear safety, and trans-
parency around military exercises—before
moving on to the more ambitious task o
establishing a new, inclusive regional
architecture that would begin to address
both countries’ security concerns.
An administration intent on pursuing
this course won’t be starting from scratch.
Recently, some Gul states—the ¬¤ chie
among them—have taken tentative steps
to reach out to Iran in an eort to reduce
tensions. They saw the growing risks o
the regional crisis spinning out o control
and recognized its potential costs. Wash-
ington should, too, before it is too late.∂deal’s restraints. This gets to the contra-
diction at the heart o the president’s
Middle East policies: they make likelier
the very military confrontation he is
determined to avoid.
WHAT MATTERS NOW
A regional conÁagration is far from
inevitable; none o the parties wants one,
and so far, all have for the most part
shown the ability to calibrate their actions
so as to avoid an escalation. But even
Änely tuned action can have uninten-
tional, outsize repercussions given the
regional dynamics. Another Iranian attack
in the Gulf. An Israeli strike in Iraq or
Syria that crosses an unclear Iranian
redline. A Houthi missile that kills too
many Saudis or an American, and a reply
that, this time, aims at the assumed
Iranian source. A Shiite militia that kills
an American soldier in Iraq. An Iranian
nuclear program that, now unshackled
from the nuclear deal’s constraints, exceeds
Israel’s or the United States’ unidentiÄed
tolerance level. One can readily imagine
how any o these incidents could spread
across boundaries, each party searching for
the arena in which its comparative advan-
tage is greatest.
With such ongoing risks, the debate
about the extent to which the United
States should distance itsel from the
region and reduce its military footprint is
important but somewhat beside the point.
Should any o these scenarios unfold, the
United States would almost certainly Änd
itsel dragged in, whether or not it had
made the strategic choice o withdrawing
from the Middle East.
The more consequential question,
therefore, is what kind o Middle East the
United States will remain engaged in or
disengaged from. A polarized region with