Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon
66 μ¢¤³£ ¬μμ¬
party in oce—will want to use U.S.
power to beat Iran into submission.
A second U.S. goal must be to gain
some leverage over Iranian foreign policy
in order to reduce the likelihood o a
conÁict between Washington and Tehran.
This is easier said than done, since a U.S.
administration would have to simultane-
ously reach out to the Iranians and
mitigate the anxieties o U.S. allies. It
will also be challenging because o
potential spoilers on the Iranian side—
namely, the hard-liners who have on
several occasions blocked rapprochement.
At a minimum, gaining meaningful
inÁuence over Iranian policymaking would
require opening a military-to-military
channel o communication with Iran,
with the initial goal o preventing
accidental clashes. That link could then
progress to quiet multilateral talks on
technical questions, move on to higher-
level political discussions regarding areas
o potential cooperation, and Änally
culminate in diplomatic normalization.
Only when the U.S. embassy reopens
in Tehran will there be enough regular,
businesslike interactions between the two
sides for the United States to inÁuence
Iranian decision-making. Now that the
war in Syria is eectively over, deterrence
is holding on the Israeli-Lebanese border,
Israel has demonstrated its resolve in
preventing Iran’s entrenchment near the
Golan Heights, and the United Arab
Emirates has walked away from the
Saudi war in Yemen, there is an opportu-
nity for cautious movement. Trump is
unlikely to grasp it, largely because the
perceived political cost is too high. But
the next administration should, at long
last, give sustained engagement a try.∂GETTING BACK TO NORMAL
There are, to be sure, Áickering signals
that Trump will end up conforming to
the established pattern on Iran, striving
to seem tough in public while seeking a
private accommodation. His decision not
to retaliate against Iran’s downing o an
American drone in June, his eorts to
arrange a phone call with Rouhani, and
his recent Äring o Bolton all point in
this direction. But such an about-face is
unlikely. Trump’s Republican backers,
both in and out o Congress, still support
a hard line against Tehran, and the
Iranians will be doubtful that Trump can
be trusted to stick with any deal. He will
likely leave oce as determined to
subjugate Iran as he was on entering it.
Yet the United States—i not under
Trump, then under his successor—has a
compelling interest in Änding a modus
vivendi with Iran, just as it repeatedly
sought to do with the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. Washington’s
most important goal should be to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons—a development that could
destabilize the entire Middle East. The
most eective way to do this is through
multilateral diplomacy along the lines o
the È¢¬. This would not only provide
for an inspections regime that would
augment Western intelligence gathering
but also create incentives for Iranian
cooperation; by contrast, a confronta-
tional approach will strengthen Iran’s
hard-liners and produce perpetual
incentives for Iran to cheat. Finding a
workable arrangement, however, will
require bold diplomacy by a future
Democratic administration, which will
need to overcome the objections o both
the Republican Party and an Israeli
government that—regardless o the