Richard Fontaine
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Guidelines such as these cannot possibly supply all the answers
policymakers might need, but they can point to the right questions.
Requiring decision-makers to clearly deÄne the objectives o the pos-
sible intervention, for example, will force them to distinguish between
managing a problem (such as preventing Afghanistan from becoming
a terrorist safe haven) and solving it (such as rendering that country a
Taliban-free modern democracy). Enlisting allies in the eort should
involve an honest assessment o their strengths and weaknesses,
whether those allies are someone in the nature o Afghan President
Hamid Karzai, or exiles in Iraq, or European troops in Libya, or the
Syrian Democratic Forces. And the judgment about an operation’s
likely costs and beneÄts should include an analysis o the success or
failure o various approaches in the past, such as targeted counterter-
rorism operations or a full-Áedged counterinsurgency campaign.
One traditional way o thinking about intervention is represented by
the Powell Doctrine, developed by General Colin Powell during the
Gul War, which emphasizes the importance o using decisive force,
having a clear exit strategy, and mobilizing U.S. public support. But the
opposite has proved at least equally important in recent wars: there will
be cases in which the employment o modest force over an open-ended
timeline will be the better strategy. Policymakers’ general unwilling-
ness to contemplate a long-term U.S. presence in a foreign country,
along with their tendency to see conÁicts as temporary problems that
can be solved in a limited period o time, often makes them rush for the
exits when the going gets tough. Had the United States not frantically
sought an o-ramp in both Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, its pros-
pects for success in both conÁicts would have been brighter—and, para-
doxically, the wars might have ended sooner. Even many years after the
initiation o those conÁicts, sustainable, low-cost, and long-term Amer-
ican engagement is preferable to unconditional withdrawal.
A new set o guidelines would also take a more nuanced approach
to determining whether an intervention is politically sustainable.
The usual model holds that presidents should paint a picture o the
threat for Americans and then elicit their support for war, hoping to
wind down operations before the public grows weary o the conÁict.
Yet political support hinges less on a war’s duration than it does on
its Änancial costs, casualties, and perceived progress. Reducing losses
and making concrete steps toward a conÁict’s stated objective are
critical to maintaining popular support over the long run. Instead o