24 The New York Review
the “Lacoste” group, after the French
fashion line with the crocodile logo. He
also could count on the support of the
National Liberation War Veterans As-
sociation, the shock troops of Mugabe’s
violent land seizures, and elements of
Zimbabwe’s armed forces, including
the commander in chief, Constantino
Chiwenga, with whom he had over-
seen Operation Gukurahundi. Grace
Mugabe’s party support rested on a
circle of young, social media–savvy
politicians known as Generation 40, or
G40, a “new guard” that believed the
revered war veterans had accumulated
too much power. G40, named by Jona-
than Moyo, a Svengali- like figure who
served as Grace Mugabe’s closest aide
and stirred her presidential ambitions,
“wanted to create a new narrative that
you didn’t have to fight in the war to
lead the country,” one party insider told
me in December 2017. “Anyone linked
to the war had to be eliminated.” The
split between the two factions had little
to do with ideology or a vision for the
country. “Both factions were corrupt,”
writes Rogers. “They had all been part
of a government and party that had pil-
laged the nation for decades.”
As Rogers tells the story, the battle
over succession intensified toward
the end of 2017. That winter, Mugabe
embarked on a series of Presidential
Youth Interface Rallies designed to
stoke enthusiasm for ZANU-PF before
the next presidential election in 2018.
Grace traveled with him and, with
Mugabe often too enfeebled to address
the crowds, filled in with gusto. She
used the opportunity to make a move
against Mnangagwa. Rogers writes:
At rally after rally the First Lady,
51, long- limbed as an antelope,
glamorous in designer glasses and
chic beret... prowled the stages,
mic in hand, verbally assaulting
her elder rival as he sat numb and
emotionless just a few yards away
from her. He was a “usurper,” she
said, a “traitor”; he was plotting a
military coup against her husband.
Mnangagwa brought matters to a
head at a rally in Bulawayo in early
November. He and his aides bussed
in hundreds of war veterans and other
supporters to a soccer stadium and, as
Grace Mugabe began another diatribe
from the stage, the crowd started boo-
ing her. “It was unheard of,” Rogers
writes. At that point, the nonagenarian
president “stumbled to the microphone
and waved a bony finger in the air.
‘We are denigrated and insulted in the
name of Mnangagwa?...I will remove
him!’” Mnangagwa was out of power—
and on the run—within days.
Mnangagwa’s flight to Mozambique
and then refuge in South Africa
prompted an outpouring of jubila-
tion among members of the G40 fac-
tion. Grace Mugabe, it seemed, was on
her way to coronation as Zimbabwe’s
vice-president, one weakening heart-
beat away from the presidency. The
drama might have ended there were it
not for a coalition of disaffected spies,
ZANU-PF officials of wavering loyalty,
and longtime Mugabe opponents who
had been meeting across the border in
South Africa for two years, reaching
out to potential allies there in the rul-
ing party and the military, quietly erod-
ing Mugabe’s support.
Rogers devotes half his book to this
previously unknown campaign, focus-
ing on several of the participants. Tom
Ellis, a white Zimbabwean who had
fled the country as a teenager in 1980,
owned a small home maintenance
business in Randburg, a neighbor-
hood in northwest Johannesburg, but
he devoted most of his time to provid-
ing moral support to the opposition in
exile. Ellis had helped smuggle Move-
ment for Democratic Change activists
out of Zimbabwe during the crackdown
that followed Tsvangirai’s victory in
2008; met regularly in a smoke-filled
sports bar called the Sundowner with
a procession of opposition activists,
human rights lawyers, and dispos-
sessed farmers; and organized visits
to the International Criminal Court
at The Hague to draw attention to
Mugabe’s abuses. “His thing—his love,
his passion, his all- consuming obses-
sion—was the politics and business of
Zimbabwe,” Rogers writes.
Charles Wezhira, aka Agent Kasper,
a karate blackbelt, former member of a
paramilitary police unit known as the
Black Boots, and agent with Mugabe’s
Central Intelligence Organization, had
spied for years on Zimbabwe’s diaspora
in Johannesburg. In 2015 he received
an assignment from his spymasters to
assassinate Ellis by shooting him at an
ATM to make it look like a robbery.
Ellis noticed he was being followed
and turned the tables on his would-be
killer, blocking his car at a traffic light
and inviting him for a drink at the Sun-
downer. Wezhira, as it turned out, had
grown disenchanted with the regime
and his job, and the encounter led to a
strategic partnership.
The most prominent figure in the
nascent coalition was Christopher
Mutsvangwa, a war veteran and long-
time ZANU-PF stalwart. Described
by Rogers as “a broad- shouldered
middleweight with a perfectly round
shaved head and a penchant for sharp
suits and colourful silk ties,” he had
run the state- owned TV network; over-
seen the Mineral Marketing Corpora-
tion, which is responsible for selling
Zimbabwe’s diamonds; and served as
ambassador to China during the Look
East policy of the 2000s, when US and
European economic sanctions obliged
Mugabe to seek other support for his
regime. Mutsvangwa also served as the
head of a war veterans group, which
by 2016 was under near daily attack
by Grace Mugabe and her G40 allies,
who accused them of being “drunks”
and “lunatics.” Robert Mugabe fired
Mutsvangwa following a protest march
organized by the veterans in Harare.
After publicly denouncing the First
Lady as “a mad woman latched onto
the tenuous blessings of a marriage cer-
tificate,” Mutsvangwa began contact-
ing senior military officers, warning
them that the Mugabes were destroy-
ing the country. He also flew to South
Africa, where he met Ellis. As Rogers
writes, the two men formed an unlikely
alliance:
By rights they should have been
enemies: Mutsvangwa was a fa-
mous member of the political party
that had laid waste to Zimbabwe.
He was the Chairman of an or-
ganisation that had taken [Ellis’s]
sister’s farm and those of dozens
of his friends; it was war veterans
who had assaulted white farm-
ers, beaten and killed their work-
ers. War veterans were the shock
troops Mugabe could always call
on for violence.
A series of meetings between the
anti- Mugabe diaspora community and
disillusioned Mugabe loyalists led,
in the summer of 2016, to the North-
gate Declaration, a verbal pact that
committed the participants to oppose
G40 and support Mnangagwa for the
presidency. Ellis and his cohorts had
little affection for the Crocodile. Even
so, they regarded the fragmented and
weakened MDC as ineffective, viewed
Grace as a meddlesome amateur who
was unlikely to break from the ruinous
policies of her husband, and were reas-
sured by the pro- Western, pro- business
messages carried by Mnangagwa’s
emissaries to South Africa. Over the
next months, Wezhira moved between
Johannesburg and Harare, trying to
turn his contacts in the security agen-
cies against Mugabe. Mutsvangwa con-
tinued his efforts to line up support
among senior military officers, while
Ellis sought to overcome the suspicions
of the MDC leadership and bring all the
parties together.
How important was this group in ex-
pediting the Mugabes’ downfall? The
president’s strategic blunders prob-
ably contributed the most to it. After
Mnangagwa’s escape from Zimbabwe,
Mugabe, fearing betrayal, ordered
Supporters of Emmerson Mnangagwa waiting for his return to Zimbabwe on the day after
Robert Mugabe resigned as president, Harare, November 2017
K
im Ludbrook /
EPA
- EFE
/Shutterstock