26 BriefingUkraine and impeachment The EconomistOctober 12th 2019
2 imf, which was funding billions of dollars
of Ukrainian debt, Mr Poroshenko backed
down. Mr Sytnik remained in his job and
naburetained its independence.
Mr Lutsenko, in office but weakened
and humiliated, found himself in a bind.
So he looked to a powerful outsider for sup-
port: President Donald Trump’s White
House. Although this seemed to be on his
own initiative, Mr Lutsenko rarely did any-
thing without Mr Poroshenko’s approval.
The president, who had favoured Hillary
Clinton in the American elections of 2016,
was keen to patch things up with Mr
Trump. The feeling was not mutual—but
Mr Lutsenko was still of interest.
Rudy Giuliani thought he was on to a
good thing. In his role as President Donald
Trump’s personal attorney he had made it
known that he was interested in digging up
dirt about Ukrainian support for Mrs Clin-
ton, and any special favours which might
have been done on behalf of Mr Biden. Ac-
cording to Mr Lutsenko, two of Mr Giu-
liani’s other clients, Lev Parnas and Igor
Fruman, got in touch with him at Mr Giu-
liani’s behest in late 2017.
Mr Parnas and Mr Fruman are Ukrai-
nian-American businessmen based in
Florida. Mr Fruman owns a boutique hotel
and a beach club in their native Odessa, as
well as a bar in Kiev known for its profes-
sional escorts. Mr Parnas was once a stock-
broker. The Washington Post has reported
that, in 2016, a court ordered him to pay
more than $500,000 to an investor in a
never-made movie called “Anatomy of an
Assassin”; according to court records Mr
Parnas is still being pursued over the debt.
Yet a complaint in front of America’s Feder-
al Election Commission says that Mr Par-
nas, Mr Fruman and shell companies with
which they are associated have still man-
aged to contribute over $400,000 to va-
rious Republican campaigns and organisa-
tions, including America First Action, a
pro-Trump “superpac”.
Mr Lutsenko looked like pay dirt to Mr
Giuliani. So did Mr Shokin, his predeces-
sor, who was angry at having been denied a
visa to visit his daughter in California,
something he blamed on Ms Yovanovitch.
On January 23rd 2019 Mr Giuliani had a
phone call with Mr Shokin (Mr Parnas acted
as interpreter). According to notes Mr Giu-
liani later provided to the State Depart-
ment, Mr Shokin alleged that his investiga-
tions into Burisma were effectively
terminated not because Mr Poroshenko
thought he was a “good guy” but because of
pressure from Mr Pyatt, the American am-
bassador, and Vice-President Biden.
Two days later Mr Giuliani met Mr Lut-
senko. Again according to Mr Giuliani’s
notes, Mr Lutsenko produced a document
from Latvia appearing to show transfers of
several million dollars from a Burisma
bank account, including $1.15m to MrKwasnewski and undisclosed sums to Mr
Biden and Mr Archer. He also spoke of a
payment of $900,000 to Rosemont Seneca
Partners, a consultancy co-founded by
Hunter Biden, in return for lobbying ser-
vices by Mr Biden’s father. On October 9th
Andriy Derkach, a former member of the
Ukrainian secret service who has now be-
come an mp, repeated that allegation. Mr
Derkach has close ties to Mr Lutsenko.
There is no evidence that this claim is true.
On January 26th Mr Giuliani and Mr Lut-
senko met again. This time, the talk was of
Paul Manafort. After the downfall of Mr Ya-
nukovych, a book that contained records of
payments made from a slush fund was
passed to the security services. In the
spring of 2016 this “black ledger” reached
nabu. Soon afterwards details of a pay-
ment to Mr Manafort for services for Mr Ya-
nukovych were disclosed to the New York
Times. The revelation led to Mr Manafort
being fired from his position managing Mr
Trump’s campaign and contributed to his
later imprisonment.
Mr Giuliani also noted a claim that Mr
Sytnik of nabuhad been secretly recorded
by Ukraine’s security service saying that he
was keen to help Hillary Clinton’s cam-
paign. Mr Derkach now claims he has docu-
ments showing that nabuworked closely
with the American embassy in 2017.The presidents’ men
In March 2019 Mr Lutsenko went public,
telling John Salmon of The Hill, a political
website, that Ms Yovanovitch gave him
“stop lists” that kept certain people in Uk-
raine safe from investigation. Ms Yovano-
vitch was recalled to Washington the fol-
lowing month because, in Mr Giuliani’s
words, “she was part of the efforts against
the president”. The State Department dis-
missed this as an “outright fabrication”.
The next month Mr Poroshenko lost theUkrainian elections to Volodymyr Zelen-
sky, a television comedian. Mr Parnas and
Mr Fruman immediately contacted a mem-
ber of Mr Zelensky’s team to arrange a
meeting between him and Mr Giuliani.
Mr Zelensky, newly installed in office,
was in a bind. He had been elected on a pro-
mise to overhaul the corrupt system which
was undermining Ukraine’s prosperity and
security (his government is currently in-
vestigating Mr Poroshenko and Mr Lut-
senko). And he wanted money, weaponry
and symbols of support such as state visits
to help him face down Russia. But he did
not want to be dragged into using his posi-
tion to settle American political scores.
On May 9th, the New York Timesreport-
ed that Mr Giuliani was on his way to Kiev.
Keen to keep his distance, Mr Zelensky de-
clined to meet him. On May 12th, Mr Lut-
senko visited Mr Zelensky and urged him
to see Mr Giuliani. “He said he had a num-
ber for Mr Giuliani and that Giuliani would
connect him to Mr Trump,” a person famil-
iar with that meeting says. Again, Mr Zelen-
sky declined.
Kurt Volker, America’s special envoy to
Ukraine charged with resolving the con-
flict in Donbas, tried to smooth the build-
ing tension ahead of a telephone call with
Mr Trump. On July 7th he had a breakfast
with Mr Giuliani. Later that day he texted
Mr Giuliani to introduce him to Andriy Yer-
mak, a top adviser to Mr Zelensky. A few
hours later he texted William Taylor, the
American representative in Ukraine, and
Gordon Sondland, a Republican fund-rais-
er who had become Mr Trump’s ambassa-
dor to the eu: “Had breakfast with Rudy
this morning—teeing up call w[ith] Yermak
Monday. Must have helped. Most impt [im-
portant] is for Zelensky to say that he will
help investigation—and address any spe-
cific personnel issues—if there are any.”
On July 25th, Donald Trump probably
thought he was on to a good thing. He was
about to call the neophyte president of a
poor, embattled country—a country whose
previous leaders had, in Mr Trump’s mind,
conspired to do him down, but which also
might hold the key to smearing his possible
adversary in the coming election and pro-
viding some justification for pardoning Mr
Manafort. Mr Zelensky’s weak position
meant he had every reason to grant whatev-
er favours Mr Trump might ask of him
A few hours before the call between the
two presidents was scheduled to take
place, Mr Volker texted Mr Yermak. “Heard
from White House—assuming President Z
convinces trump he will investigate/“get to
the bottom of what happened” in 2016, we
will nail down date for visit to Washington.
Good luck!”
And so, at the end of a decades-long saga
of reciprocal corruption, spiralling cyni-
cism and abuse of office, Mr Trump picked
up the phone. 7