New Internationalist - 11.2019 - 12.2019

China

only have heard of it relatively recently is

because of the waves it has been causing

geopolitically. Earlier this year, the UK

government halted the telecommunica-

tions company from rolling out its 5G

network, citing ‘security’ concerns, while

the United States banned its own com-

panies from selling Huawei components

and technology.

Is Huawei really a ‘threat’? ‘When it

installed servers in the African Union it

was demonstrated that they were really

vulnerable to being exploited,’ says Rui

Zhong, from the Wilson Centre in Wash-

ington DC. ‘Huawei technicians [have

also been accused of helping] Zambia

and Uganda target political opponents.’

However, the US has been reluctant to

provide specific details about the sup-

posed threat Huawei poses to its allies,

leading some to speculate that politics

rather than ‘security’ is carrying the day.

‘Chy-na!’ was the catchphrase of

Trump’s presidential campaign. It

exposed a wound in US supremacy:

‘China’s upset because of the way Donald

Trump is talking about trade with China,’

he said in 2016. ‘They’re ripping us off

folks; it’s time. I’m so happy they’re upset.’

While Trump’s tone and comments have

varied wildly since he assumed the Presi-

dency (‘I don’t blame China,’ Trump

said in 2018. ‘After all, who can blame a

country for being able to take advantage

of another country to the benefit of its

citizens?’) he has made good on appear-

ing to confront the world’s second-largest

economy through an erratic trade war.

This comes after the years Washington

has spent building up its military capac-

ity in the Pacific; as John Pilger observed

in NI 498 (‘The coming war on China’),

more than 400 military bases bearing

US firepower, including weapons of mass

destruction, encircle China. In response,

China has developed a more assertive

foreign policy. Mao’s dictum was that

China must ‘stand up’; Deng’s that China

must ‘get rich’; Xi’s is that China must

‘become strong’.

As Chinese economic projects diffuse

overseas, a ‘stronger’ foreign policy is

inevitable. As China’s minister of foreign

affairs said in 2016: ‘At present there are

30,000 Chinese businesses all over the

world... and the stock of [our] overseas

assets reached several trillion dollars. So

it has become a pressing task for China’s

diplomacy to better protect our growing

overseas interests.’ During the 2011

Libyan civil war, China had its first taste

of engaging with Middle Eastern politics

like a Western power: after first profess-

ing ‘neutrality’ it eventually recognized

the NATO-backed government, presum-

ably because its priority was protecting

the billions of dollars’ worth of economic

interests it had in the country. In 2017, the

People’s Liberation Army opened its first

overseas military base in Djibouti, Africa.

Hit the road, Xi

The United States still possesses the

largest military capabilities by a long

margin. So Xi’s assertiveness will be

underwritten by economic might rather

than his military arsenal. The cen-

trepiece of this is the Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI), a Chinese-financed

infrastructure programme that spans

over 60 countries, mainly in the Global

South (see pages 24-25). Smarting from

their experiences with the US-backed

IMF, which often demands public-spend-

ing cuts in return for financial lifelines,

many elites in developing countries have

turned to China for money. A network of

Chinese-financed railways, bridges, ports

and power-stations stretches from Latin

America to Central Asia.

The US, worried about losing influ-

ence, stokes fears about ‘debt-trap diplo-

macy’ behind the BRI – the thesis is that

China is purposefully indebting poorer

countries in order to render them client

states. Meanwhile, soccer fans in Zambia

watch matches in a 50,000-seat stadium

paid for by China and half of Cambodia’s

electricity is generated by Chinese-built

hydroelectric dams. Whether Washing-

ton likes it or not, the world is increas-

ingly ‘built by China’.^10

But Beijing is not acting selflessly. The

BRI is a way of dealing with domestic

problems, like over-capacity (producing

too much stuff that China can’t consume

itself), surplus capital (having too much

infrastructure and money sloshing

about), falling profits and a scarcity of raw

materials.^11 A global China, just like the

US or imperial Britain before it, is simply

pursuing its interests.

It is also a deeply political project.

Becoming a major investor in smaller

countries ensures loyalty to China. Take

the situation in Xinjiang, northwestern

China, where millions of Uyghurs – a

Turkic-speaking ethnic minority – have

been surveyed, detained and sent to re-

education camps (for more on Xinjiang,

see page 26). When Pakistan’s prime

minister Imran Khan was asked earlier

NOVEMBER- DECEMBER 2019 19

I

VOICES

FROM

CHINA

LUO YINGXIONG,

FACTORY WORKER

GUANGDONG

As told to Alec Ash

What do you think of China’s rise to

power on the world stage?

Before, people would look down on

China, or criticize us. Now China is more

powerful, and we can look down on

other countries. I think it’s great. I hope

we can become even stronger, so that

in the future no-one will bully us, like

your country [the United Kingdom] did

a hundred years ago... When Xi Jinping

goes overseas, other leaders respect him

now. America is trying to slow down our

development, but the Chinese people

have a lot of determination... I am making

my life better each day, and the Party is

doing the same for China.

(Opposite left) Since the 2008 economic crisis,
China has invested heavily in infrastructure. The
largest radio telescope in the world, for observing
outer space, was completed in 2016 in southwest
China.
LIU XU/XINHUA/ALAMY