Anne McElvoy is
senior editor at The
Economist and presents
France and Germany:
Divided They Stand for
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together; indeed, the prospect of a
British goodbye has had a consolidating
effect on the big countries – certainly,
no one else is in a hurry to leave. Yet
the Rhine Divide is still felt as the
EU faces up to the all-round impact
of a ‘No Deal’ Brexit. France seems
more inclined to cut the UK loose
and deal with the damage to the EU.
Merkel is more cautious, unwilling
to be seen to welcome the sudden
fracturing of a significant trading
relationship. Tonally, the mood differs,
even as the two insist on presenting
a unified front in Brussels.
The impact of the final outcome may
stretch beyond internal British politics,
even if the leader in Downing Street
finds that, as one mistress naughtily said
of Louis X IV, he is “a powerful king
with a ver y small sceptre” when it comes
to negotiating terms with the continent.
Yet the Rhine Divide permeates the
shape and priorities of the EU more
powerfully than the UK. Two cultures
that seek affinity channel their historical
traumas in distinctive ways. History
always flows along the Rhine.
Status check
India’s presidential order to repeal the special
status of Jammu & Kashmir reflects a long-term
trend away from secularity and federalism
BY CHITRALEKHA ZUTSHIn 5 August, the newly
re-elected Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) government in
India announced that a
presidential order had repealed Article
370 of the Indian constitution, which
had given special status to the northern
state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
The government also pushed though,
with overwhelming majorities in both
houses of parliament, a bill that stripped
J&K of its status as a state, partitioning
it into two union territories – Jammu &
Kashmir and Ladakh – to be ruled
directly by the central government.
Article 370 had been enshrined into
the Indian constitution in 1949 as a
means of defining J&K’s relationship
with the Indian Union, and reflected the
federal, plural and secular character of
the Indian polity. India had claimed
J&K precisely because the latter was a
Muslim-majority state, and was willing
to make concessions to allow Kashmiri
Muslims to feel secure in a Hindu-
majority India.
Indeed, part of the reason that the
J&K leadership was leaning towards
acceding to India in 1947 was because
India had decided to adopt a secular
constitution based on political,
economic and social rights for all
citizens, regardless of religious affiliation
or social status. This, alongside India’s
assurances that it would preserve J&K’s
autonomy within the Indian Union,
made it a safer bet than Pakistan.
As with all princely states – as it was
at the time of Indian independence in1947 – J&K deferred to India on only
three matters: defence, external affairs
and communications. In part because it
was disputed territory, and in part
because its leadership negotiated for
autonomy during constitutional talks,
Article 370 allowed J&K special
privileges. One such was the establish-
ment of its own constituent assembly,
which had the power to frame the state’s
constitution as well as make decisions
about whether it wanted to accede to
India on any further subjects.
A rticle 370, however, became a
hollow shell soon after it was implement-
ed. An earlier incarnation of the BJP, the
Bharatiya Jan Sangh, joined hands with
a movement in Jammu that emerged in
the early 1950s in an attempt to abolish
the state’s special status and integrate it
completely into India. This movement
eventually led in 1953 to the downfall of
the first government of J&K – the one
that had negotiated its special status.The insurgency in
Kashmir that began
more than 30 years
ago is likely to be
strengthened by this
latest turn of events
O