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44 Middle East & Africa The EconomistOctober 26th 2019


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tanks. A few leaders took selfies next to the
caches. Only Ivory Coast’s hot-chocolate
stand attracted as much attention.
Russia does not just supply arms, how-
ever. In several countries it has become
deeply involved in internal affairs. These
engagements reflect the defining theme of
Russia’s Africa policy: opportunism. One of
Mr Putin’s skills is an ability to spot open-
ings presented by a mix of fragile states and
a distracted West. Once it has identified an
opportunity, the Kremlin looks to increase
its influence and to make money for cro-
nies who operate on its license. Ideally
these moves can be done at low cost, with
high returns.
caris the emblematic example of this
approach. For an estimated cost of just €5m
($5.6m), Mr Putin’s cronies gained access
to minerals, provided jobs for mercenaries,
also allegedly controlled by Mr Prigozhin,
and tested out their tactics for interfering
in the politics of other countries—a speci-
ality of Mr Prigozhin, who was placed un-
der sanctions by America for allegedly
meddling in its election in 2016.
But car is far from the only case. In
Madagascar Russian operatives allegedly
helped at least six of the 36 candidates in
the presidential election in 2018. In Zimba-
bwe Russians advised the ruling Zanu-pf
party before elections last year, and Krem-
lin-linked firms have signed mining and
fertiliser deals. Western diplomats believe
Russia tried to sway elections in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo in favour of a can-
didate chosen by the former president, Jo-
seph Kabila. And in Guinea, which supplies
Rusal, a Russian aluminium firm, with
27% of its bauxite, Russia is supporting ef-
forts by President Alpha Condé to defy the
constitution and run for a third term.
Another surge of support is beginning

in Mozambique. Following a visit by Filipe
Nyusi, the country’s president, to Russia in
August, Russian hardware and advisers
have been spotted by intelligence analysts
in Cabo Delgado province, near to where
Rosneft, a Russian energy company, has
gas contracts. The advisers are believed to
have been asked to subdue an insurgency
that threatens both Rosneft’s interests and
those of the corrupt ruling party, frelimo.
All of this activity is worrying some in
the West. In a speech last year outlining
America’s Africa strategy John Bolton, the
former national-security adviser to Presi-
dent Donald Trump, called Russia and Chi-
na “great power competitors” on the conti-
nent which are keen “to gain a competitive
advantage over the United States.”
But there is a danger of conflating the
brazenness of Russia with its actual influ-
ence. In nearly every area it lags behind
America, the euand China. “China got the
juiciest bits. Russia was left to mop up the
leftovers,” says Alexander Gabuev, Russia’s
leading expert on China.
A closer look reveals Russia’s limits. Its
favoured candidates did not win in Mada-
gascar or Congo. Its attempts to prop up
Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s former dictator,
failed earlier this year. And it could not get
a nuclear-energy deal with South Africa,
despite wooing the allegedly corrupt for-
mer president, Jacob Zuma.
There is also less to Russia’s military ef-
forts than meets the eye. Ahead of the Sochi
summit Mr Putin claimed more than 30
military co-operation deals with African
states. But many amount to little more than
the odd training exercise. African states of-
ten keep their options open, striking deals
with America and China as well. Both have
a base in Djibouti, a small east African
country. Russia, though, does not, despite
years of lobbying. American pressure on
the local government has kept it out.
There is a similar gap between rhetoric
and reality when it comes to economic
deals. In 2018 the total value of Russia’s
trade with sub-Saharan Africa was $5bn,
less than Turkey, Singapore or Thailand.
(American and Chinese trade was worth
$120bn and $35bn, respectively.) Many
deals that are announced at lavish signing
ceremonies by Rosneft or Rosatom, Rus-
sia’s state nuclear company, never end up
happening. “It offers remarkably little that
African states actually need,” explains Paul
Stronski of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, a think-tank.
For all the pageantry on show in Sochi,
Russia remains a bit player in Africa. It is
influential among beleaguered leaders
with few options. But as more and more
countries scramble to engage with the con-
tinent, its leaders see Russia as one of
many suitors. Mr Putin may want Africans
to think of Russia as a great power. But a
summit does not make it so. 7

Sources:CarnegieEndowment
for International Peace; SIPRI *Trend indicator value

HeadofStateofficialvisitstoRussia,2015-19

250
100

Russia,armsexports
Approximatemilitary
value, TIV*, m
2014-18

CAR
Guinea DR C

Angola Mozambique

South
Africa

Zimbabwe

Sudan

Sales force
Russian arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa

F


our yearsafter they were welcomed as
protectors, American troops leaving
north-east Syria received a less friendly
send-off. As they drove out of the region, a
surprise withdrawal ordered by President
Donald Trump earlier this month, angry lo-
cals pelted their armoured cars with rocks
and tomatoes. “Like rats,” one man yelled.
America’s retreat cleared the way for
Turkey to invade and dislodge a Kurdish
militia, the People’s Protection Units (ypg),
that controlled the region. Backed by a rag-
gedy crew of Syrian Arab mercenaries, the
Turkish invasion was a fatal blow to Kurd-
ish autonomy. The ypghad no choice but to
seek protection from Bashar al-Assad, Syr-
ia’s dictator, and surrender most of its self-
rule in return.
At first Mr Trump acquiesced to the
Turkish offensive. Then he dispatched his
vice-president, Mike Pence, to Ankara,
where he secured a five-day ceasefire laden
with concessions to Turkey. But that agree-
ment was merely a sideshow. The real di-
plomacy took place on October 22nd in So-
chi, where President Vladimir Putin of
Russia hosted his Turkish counterpart, Re-
cep Tayyip Erdogan. They struck a deal that
leaves Turkish troops in a zone between
the Syrian towns of Tel Abyad and Ras al-
Ain, much of which they already control.
Russian military police and Syrian bor-
der guards will enter areas to the east and
west to ensure that the ypgvacates them as
well. The Kurds will have until October

CAIRO AND ISTANBUL
Russia and Turkey agree to carve up
northern Syria

The war in Syria

Vlad the dealmaker


A match made in Sochi
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