their remembrance of a ‘glorious’ past. While these two positions look quite
different, they are both compatible with the less idealistic notion advanced by
sociologist Norbert Elias, who posited that nations were born in wars and for
wars. Identities in politics are similarly born in and for confrontation.
Globalization and cultural identity
Fired by nationalism, modern wars were fought by countries. After the dust of
World War II had settled, an era of proxy wars began. It lasted until the Berlin
Wall came down in 1989, an event that symbolized the end of the Cold War that
was defined by ideological fault lines more than by national borders. At the same
time, globalization became a reality for a growing part of the world population,
not rendering states irrelevant, but reducing their power to shape the future.
While nationalism did not disappear from the political landscape and in some
parts of the world even resurged, notably in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, other
anchors of collective identity formation gained more prominence in the political
arena. In domestic politics ethnic identity re-emerged as a major factor, as we
saw in Chapter 4, and in global politics the struggle for cultural identity replaced
the ideological East–West rivalry (the competition of systems).
This is what political scientist Samuel Huntington argued in his 1996 book The
Clash of Civilizations. After leading the world for five centuries, the global
influence of the West is on the wane, and others are reasserting their cultural
identities. The victory of market liberalism over socialism has not, as promised
or at least hoped, delivered a peaceful world in which all agree on the values,
norms, and common future objectives of humankind. Instead, cultural identities
proved to be more long-lived and more important to people’s lives than political
ideologies, providing today a potent motive for rivalry and conflict.
Asia in particular, with countries as diverse as Japan, China, South Korea, and
Singapore in the lead, has driven this process forward. The new Asia is no longer
the caricature that Western Orientalism drew of it, but the continent of growth,
home to industrial and high-tech giants that proved to the world that
modernization could no longer be equated with Westernization. Other
civilizations can hold their own.
Against the backdrop of developments that impinge on the lives of common
people, such as novel technologies and mass migration, to mention but two