13◼ REMARKS Bloomberg Businessweek October 7, 2019
For centuries, small countries have relied on bigger ones to
protect them. The trick was to avoid becoming too much of
a pawn in the greater game of the superpowers.
Spanned by mountains that run more than 550 kilometers
(342 miles) and bounded by the Adriatic Sea, the Western
Balkan region is a case in point. The Greeks, Romans, Slavs,
Ottomans, and Austro-Hungarians all used it as a gateway
to expand empires, moving populations and redrawing bor-
ders in the process. A patchwork of small states might band
together to form a buffer for a while before falling apart.
They’d find protectors in each of these civilizations—after
being conquered.
Nowadays big countries use means other than raw mili-
tary power to exert influence over the Balkans. The carrots
of trade and investment have the same effect. Russia and the
U.S., and, potentially, China have aligned Balkan states with
their own broader geopolitical goals. But that game can have
incendiary results, especially with memories of the vicious
ethnic wars that split Yugoslavia into half a dozen pieces in
the 1990s still weighing on the region.
For now the possibilities for meddling are most acute in
the two main protagonists in the Balkans—Serbia and Kosovo,
backed respectively by Russia and the U.S. Ever since Kosovo,
which is ethnically mostly Albanian, unilaterally declared
independence from Serbia in 2008—nine years after the con-
flict that effectively split it off—it has struggled for diplomatic
recognition in the face of a Serb campaign against it.
The U.S. remains the most powerful nation with ties
to Kosovo. In the Kosovar capital of Pristina—Prishtina in
Albanian—locals speak in hushed tones of the U.S. as a sav-
ior after its intervention in the war with Serbia in 1999.
Washington’s support for NATO bombing campaigns forced
Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic to capitulate. Children in
Kosovo were named after Bill Clinton. His posters still hang
from sides of buildings. Still, they fret they’re too small eco-
nomically and strategically to matter to a transactional leader
like Donald Trump, especially as he’s mired in potential
impeachment ahead of an election next year. They take some
comfort from the recent departure of national security adviser
John Bolton, seen in predominantly Muslim Kosovo as less sup-
portive of their desire for independence.
Serbia has been a key factor in October’s parliamentary
election in Kosovo. While the major parties in the country
agree on the imperative to get Belgrade to the table for talks,
they differ on terms. Especially heated and controversial is the
prospect—floated by Kosovo President Hashim Thaci—of includ-
ing a land swap in any negotiations on mutual recognition, a
proposal backed by Bolton as well as Serbia’s leader.
In Serbia, President Aleksandar Vucic, head of the pop-
ulist conservative Serbian Progressive Party, is expected to
win again in a vote early next year. He’s led the efforts to
squeeze Kosovo for slapping a 100% tax on Serbian prod-
ucts, an action that came in response to Belgrade’s lobby-
ing to prevent Kosovo from joining Interpol.
Kosovo and Serbia do have something in common. Even
as he pursues a hostile policy against his neighbor, Vucic is
working hard toward greater engagement with the European
Union and the golden ring of entry to that common market.
Kosovars also look eagerly toward Europe; that’s where the
jobs are and where investment could come from.
The EU, however, may be too distracted to offer Serbia
and Kosovo the protection and patronage they want. The
new European Commission taking office in Brussels is grap-
pling with a host of challenges—including Brexit and ris-
ing anti-immigrant rhetoric from governments in Poland,
Hungary, and Italy. The risk, therefore, is that the Balkans
will drop down the list of EU priorities, leaving Kosovo and
Serbia no choice but to lean on the U.S. and Russia. Indeed,
the EU’s new foreign affairs head is from Spain, a coun-
try that doesn’t recognize Kosovo. And German Chancellor
Angela Merkel has effectively slowed down the idea of talks,
wary of Thaci’s idea of a land swap. Her concern, shared
by others, is that it would reopen the wounds of the war—
and not just between Kosovo and Serbia. There are also
other neighbors with sensitive borders such as Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Albania, and North Macedonia to think about.
But the EU has offered few proposals to decrease hostility
among the Balkans’ feuding communities.
For Russia’s Vladimir Putin, the fragile, febrile environ-
ment is a convenient place from which to needle France and
Germany and to seek to limit Europe’s influence, says Agron
Bajrami, editor-in-chief of Kosovo’s largest daily, Koha Ditore.
“Russia wants to have a hot spot in southeast Europe that will
be trouble for NATO and the European Union,” he says over
coffee at a smart hotel in Pristina.
Two decades after the war, Pristina has shiny new build-
ings, designer shops with European brands, and a lively
restaurant scene. But when the subject of Serbia comes up
on a recent rainy day, references to Moscow follow quickly.
Kosovo fears the hand of Putin. Most in the country blame
Russia for deliberately perpetuating tensions with Serbia. We
need protection from Russia, say two young women sipping
coffee in a cafe. So do many others in Pristina’s main bazaar.
Ramush Haradinaj calls Serbia and Russia a collective
“giant elephant on the other side.” At government head-
quarters, Haradinaj—who resigned in July as prime minister
to face questions in a war crimes inquiry (he denies wrong-
doing and has been acquitted twice in previous trials in The
Hague)—says Vucic is playing a double game with the West
and Russia. “Kosovo has no sympathy for Russia or Putin.● After 20 years, Kosovo and Serbia
remain enemies. And the superpowers
seem to want them to stay that way
● By Rosalind Mathieson and
Jasmina Kuzmanovic