106 AMERICAN SPY
ran (handled) a very productive unilateral agent who was working in the
capital city of Managua. My agent traveled from Managua to Palmera
every few months for debriefings.
“José” was serving as his country’s defense attaché inside his country’s
embassy in Managua. I won’t identify his home country, but politically his
government was sympathetic toward the Sandinista regime. Because of
José’s excellent natural access to senior Sandinista officials, he was one of
the CIA’s best sources of intelligence on the Soviet- and Cuban-backed
Sandinista regime. Managua was a denied area, so it was difficult for CIA
officers to meet with assets in-country. I handled José from outside Nica-
ragua, but for his protection and to maintain the secrecy of our contact,
I practiced sound operational tradecraft for all meetings and communica-
tions. If either his own country or the Sandinistas were to learn he was an
agent of the CIA, he’d be arrested, imprisoned, and possibly executed.
José was an imposing figure, over six feet tall and very strong and husky.
He enjoyed good food and whiskey, and barely fit into his trademark blue
suit and tie. A professional military man, José was a very disciplined and
productive “natural” agent who was not afraid to take calculated risks. He
believed in our mission, since he had witnessed firsthand the abuses inflicted
upon the Nicaraguan people by the ruthless and corrupt Sandinistas.
I would meet José in temporary safe houses, hotel rooms in Palmera that
I rented in alias. We typically met for several days in a row, each debriefing
lasting several hours and resulting in multiple timely and important intel-
ligence reports. I would not spend the night in the room. To ensure that the
large, anonymous hotel did not assume I’d checked out early and rent the
room to someone else, I’d mess up the bed and leave articles of clothing in
the closet, and toiletries in the bathroom. After our meetings, José would
leave the room first and I would wait another couple of hours before
exiting the hotel. The dour housekeeper had to clean up after our routine,
although espionage is probably the last thing she suspected was afoot.
As the situation in Nicaragua worsened, the CIA decided we needed
more regular reporting from José. We could not afford to wait three months
or more for each successive batch of reports. Since it was too risky to meet
him inside Nicaragua, where both he and any CIA officers would attract
enemy surveillance, we decided to provide him with secure covert commu-
nications (COVCOM) equipment. This would allow him to regularly send