126 AMERICAN SPYDuring the Cold War, recruiting a Soviet KGB officer was the ultimate
goal of every CIA officer. Penetrating the monolithic Soviet intelligence
apparatus was the bane and basis of the CIA’s existence. Aside from having
natural access to valuable intelligence on Moscow’s plans, intentions, and
capabilities, KGB officers could also provide critical counterintelligence
(CI) reporting. At the top of our list of CI requirements was whether the
CIA was penetrated by a Soviet mole. A well-placed KGB officer working
secretly for the CIA could have warned us, for example, that notorious CIA
traitor Aldrich “Rick” Ames was a long-term KGB asset. This knowledge
could have helped prevent the capture and execution of the CIA’s indis-
pensable agent Soviet general Fedorovich Polyakov, who along with many
other agents was betrayed by Ames to the KGB. Code-named “Tophat,”
Polyakov passed secret intelligence to the CIA about Soviet missiles and
nuclear strategy, and he identified Soviet spies living in the United States.^1
The Tophat operation is proof of the concept that a single KGB asset can
save countless lives and significantly enhance the national security of the
United States.
The CIA categorized Soviet and other bloc officials as “hard targets”
precisely because it was next to impossible to recruit them to spy for the
United States. In part because it was nearly impossible for CIA officers to
meet and spend private “quality time” with them away from the prying
eyes of their Soviet embassy colleagues. Soviet officials abroad were closely
monitored by the KGB and were forbidden to have social contact with
US officials. They were carefully vetted before being deployed overseas to
ensure their loyalty to the USSR. A dissatisfied Soviet could always defect,
but it was a rare and risky occurrence. The Soviet government would retal-
iate against children and other family members of defectors or spies back
in the USSR, and this was another compelling incentive to Soviets living in
other countries to avoid all contact with Americans.
Faced with this Sisyphean task, how was a hapless CIA officer ever to
meet, much less recruit, a Soviet spy? Patience, luck, and meticulous opera-
tional planning, for starters.
The journey of a thousand miles begins with one step. That first step
was headquarters validation of any particular Soviet target, based on his