CIA VS. KGB 131Although I’d recruited and run several productive non-Soviet agents during
my three-year tour in Palmera, my development of Boris was considered
more important than any of those career-enhancing “scalps.” It was dif-
ficult enough to meet a validated Soviet target, much less develop a real,
long-term relationship with one. With the help of many team players like
Scott, Amy, and Gerber who remained in the shadows in Palmera and at
Langley, I’d managed to do both, and it was the most fun and rewarding
Spy vs. Spy experience of my career. But after nearly three years of prog-
ress, the correct decision was made to stand down on making any kind of
recruitment approach.
Why didn’t I pitch him? We had a solid enough relationship and
liked and trusted each other as much as was possible under these very
unusual and restrictive circumstances. Boris was clearly a risk-taker who
took advantage of his freedom. But the reality was he had never evinced
any real vulnerabilities to indicate he would be amenable to a recruitment
pitch. This was fairly evident right from the start. He was not your run-of-
the-mill KGB officer, but on balance he was and always would be a loyal
Soviet officer. Recruiting Boris, while a lofty goal, was not my real aim. My
objective was to forge a strong relationship of trust with Boris so that if
and when the day came that he had “mentally defected” and was ready to
switch sides, he’d know whom to call.