DENIED AREA OPERATIONS 171Every facet of my life in Belgrade was geared toward one clear objective:
the secure handling of HITCH. To securely handle a sensitive penetra-
tion of a hostile security service in a denied area required a full-time
commitment and focus on the mission. The first step was to follow a
work and lifestyle routine to blend in and not come to the attention of
the SDB. Unfortunately, I cannot describe what that entailed. Meetings
with HITCH took place only once every few months, but meticulous
preparation was required in advance of each meeting. All of my previous
tradecraft and surveillance training and operational experience would be
called upon and put to the test during this denied area assignment. This
was a traditional Cold War, Spy vs. Spy way of life. This was why many of
us joined the CIA in the first place, borrowing from the Cold War classic
Dr. Strangelove: to go “toe-to-toe with the Russkies.”^1 (Or, in my case, their
cousins the Yugoslavs.)
I would typically spend from two to four months preparing for each
ten-minute meeting. This was not Latin America, where I might have as
many as fifteen agent meetings in one week. Generally speaking, I had to
ensure I was black not only when meeting HITCH but also when per-
forming other operational acts, such as marking signals and casing and
photographing sites. It was possible to monitor signals while under surveil-
lance. It was also possible to case and clandestinely photograph sites while
under surveillance when necessary.
In the “old days,” before photography and everything else was digi-
tized, spying (to my mind anyway) was much more fun. We used old-school
miniature Minox spy cameras, palmed in one hand over the steering wheel
so that trailing surveillance would be unaware we were photographing
something ahead of the car. We developed the tiny film strips in the station
dark room. We relied on actual paper maps, which naturally were typi-
cally out of date. To ensure the accuracy of our comprehensive and opera-
tionally critical casing reports, we would laboriously case and photograph
signal and meeting sites and create our own detailed, accurate maps and
diagrams. We essentially created our own Google Maps and Google Street
View, but instead of covering the world, we only covered routes and sites
that were relevant to us as working spies. Instead of highlighting all loca-
tions of interest, the way Google does, we indicated on our maps posi-
tions of police and other threats to our SDRs and operational activities. In